Published Issues



Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 14, Issue 4, December 2009


The pricing of earnings and cash flows and an affirmation of accrual accounting

Stephen H Penman and Nir Yehuda

 

Changes in bonus contracts in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley era

Mary Ellen Carter, Luann J. Lynch and Sarah Zechman           

 

Managerial incentives for discretionary disclosure: evidence from management leveraged buyouts

Nader M. Hafzalla

 

Bankruptcy prediction: the case of Japanese listed companies

Ming Xu and Chu Zhang

 

Financial reporting complexity and investor under-reaction to 10-K information

Hiafeng You and Xiao-Jun Zhang

 

Team earnings forecasting

Lawrence D. Brown and Artur Hugon


Abstracts
Volume 14, Issue 4, December 2009


The pricing of earnings and cash flows and an affirmation of accrual accounting

Stephen H Penman and Nir Yehuda

 

Under accrual accounting, earnings add to shareholders’ equity. Cash flow generated by a business has no effect on the book value of shareholders’ equity, but reduces the book value of net assets employed in business operations. In short, accrual accounting rules prescribe that earnings add to shareholder value but cash flow is irrelevant to the valuation of equity. This paper documents that the stock market prices equity shares according to this prescription. Earnings are priced positively but, given earnings, a dollar more of free cash flow from a business – cash from operations minus cash investment – is, on average, associated with approximately a dollar less in the market value of the business, and has no association with changes in the market value of the equity claim on the business. Further, controlling for the cash investment component of free cash flow, “cash flow from operations” also reduces the market value of the business dollar-for-dollar, and is unrelated to the changes in market value of the equity.

 

Changes in bonus contracts in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley era

Mary Ellen Carter, Luann J. Lynch and Sarah Zechman

 

We examine whether the relation between earnings and bonuses changes after Sarbanes–Oxley. Theory predicts that, as the financial reporting system reduces the discretion allowed managers, firms will put more weight on earnings in compensation contracts to encourage effort. However, the increased risk imposed by Sarbanes–Oxley on executives may cause firms to temper this contracting outcome. We examine and find support for the joint hypothesis that the implementation of Sarbanes–Oxley and related reforms led to a decrease in earnings management and that firms responded by placing more weight on earnings in bonus contracts. We find no evidence that firms changed compensation contracts to compensate executives for assuming more risk.     

 

Managerial incentives for discretionary disclosure: evidence from management leveraged buyouts

Nader M. Hafzalla

 

Managers in management leveraged buyout (MBO) firms prefer to purchase their firms at a low offer price. This motive gives them a clear incentive to make pessimistic discretionary disclosures. Using a sample of press releases, I find that managers involved in their firms’ MBO selectively release negative disclosures to denigrate their firm just before the MBO transaction when compared with prior period: they issue more bad news disclosures and more pessimistic quotes. Additionally, they issue less optimistic quotes, fewer good news disclosures, less positive earnings forecasts, and they manage earnings downwards. I control for factors that may not be caused by managers’ purchase motives by comparing the MBO sample with a third-party leveraged buyout sample where management is not involved in the buyout and with a performance-matched control sample. I find that the disclosure of MBO firms becomes significantly more pessimistic than the leveraged buyout firms where management is not involved in the transaction and significantly more pessimistic than the performance-matched control sample.

 

Bankruptcy prediction: the case of Japanese listed companies

Ming Xu and Chu Zhang

 

This paper investigates if bankruptcy of Japanese listed companies can be predicted using data from 1992 to 2005. We find that the traditional measures, such as Altman’s (J Finance 23:589–609, 1968) Z-score, Ohlson’s (J Accounting Res 18:109–131, 1980) O-score and the option pricing theory-based distance-to-default, previously developed for the U.S. market, are also individually useful for the Japanese market. Moreover, the predictive power is substantially enhanced when these measures are combined. Based on the unique Japanese institutional features of main banks and business groups (known as Keiretsu), we construct a new measure that incorporates bank dependence and Keiretsu dependence. The new measure further improves the ability to predict bankruptcy of Japanese listed companies.

 

Financial reporting complexity and investor under-reaction to 10-K information

Hiafeng You and Xiao-Jun Zhang

 

We study the immediate and delayed market reaction to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) EDGAR 10-K filings. Unusual trading volumes and stock-price movements are documented during the days around the 10-K filing dates. The abnormal price movements are positively associated with future accounting profitability, indicating that 10-K reports contain useful information about future firm performance. In addition, investors’ reaction to 10-K information seems sluggish, as demonstrated by the stock-price drift during the 12-month period after 10-K filing. We find that investors’ underreaction tends to be stronger for firms with more complex 10-K reports.

 

Team earnings forecasting

Lawrence D. Brown and Artur Hugon

 

While brokerage houses use both teams of sell-side analysts and individual analysts to conduct earnings research, there is no empirical research examining whether teams and individuals differ with regard to their forecasting performance or purpose. We first examine the most-often researched dimension of forecasting performance, earnings forecast accuracy, and show that teams are less accurate than individual analysts in general and their own individual team members in particular. We conjecture that teams focus their efforts on an alternative dimension of forecasting performance, timeliness, and show that team forecasts are timelier than those of individual analysts in general and their own individual team members in particular. Consistent with the notion that teams trade-off forecast accuracy for timeliness to comply with a market research demand, we show that team forecast revisions are associated with larger market responses than those of individuals. Finally, we illuminate the nature of team assignments by documenting that the firms that teams follow are in greater financial distress and larger in size.

 



Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 14, Issue 2/3, June/September 2009

This double issue contains papers presented at a conference entitled, Current Topics in Accounting Research, which was held at the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, NC in October, 2008. 


Editorial

Stanley Baiman

 

Are special items informative about future profit margins?

Patricia M. Fairfield, Karen A. Kitching and Vickie W. Tang

 

Discussion of “Are special items informative about future profit margins?”
Richard M. Frankel

 

On the relation between expected returns and implied cost of capital

John S. Hughes, Jing Liu and Jun Liu

 

Discussion of “On the relation between expected returns and implied cost of capital”

Richard Lambert

 

Explicit relative performance evaluation in performance-vested equity grants

Mary Ellen Carter, Christopher D. Ittner and Sarah L.C. Zechman

 

Discussion of “Explicit relative performance evaluation in performance-vested equity grants”

Fabrizio Ferri

 

Dynamic performance measurement with intangible assets

Carlos Corona

 

Discussion of “Dynamic performance measurement with intangible assets”

Sunil Dutta

 

Are analysts’ earnings forecasts more accurate when accompanied by cash flow forecasts?

Andrew Call, Shuping Chen and Yen H. Tong

 

Discussion of “Are analysts’ earnings forecasts more accurate when accompanied by cash flow forecasts?”

Reuven Lehavy

 

The Robustness of the Sarbanes Oxley Effect on the U.S. capital market

Bowe Hansen, Grace Pownall and Xue Wang

 

Discussion of “The Robustness of the Sarbanes Oxley Effect on the U.S. capital market”

Trevor Harris


Abstracts

Volume 14, Issue 2/3, June/September 2009

This double issue contains papers presented at a conference entitled, Current Topics in Accounting Research, which was held at the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, NC in October, 2008. 


Are special items informative about future profit margins?

Patricia M. Fairfield, Karen A. Kitching and Vickie W. Tang

 

Most proponents of using profit margins in forecasting models suggest that unusual items be removed from income to create a core profit margin.  We investigate the appropriateness of this assumption over short and long horizons.  Specifically, we explore the association between profit margins and special items over windows of increasing length, from one to five years.

 

We find that the association between past special items and future profit margins differs markedly between firms with low and high core profitability.  For low profitability firms, past special items have no association with future profit margins, even over windows of five years.  In sharp contrast, for high profitability firms, negative special items are associated with lower future profit margins.  This suggests that some firms maintain high core profitability by becoming serial chargers and special items differ from core earnings only to the extent that the allocation process induces timing errors in reported earnings.

 

Discussion of “Are special items informative about future profit margins?”
Richard M. Frankel

 

Fairfield, Kitching, and Tang (2009) explore the predictive power of current special items for future profit margins over various forecast horizons.  They also provide evidence on how this predictive power varies with current core profit margins.  I discuss the motivation for this research and conclude that I am unable to attach a coherent economic story to these results.

 

On the relation between expected returns and implied cost of capital

John S. Hughes, Jing Liu and Jun Liu

 

We examine the relation between implied cost of capital and expected returns under an assumption that expected returns are stochastic, a property supported by theory and empirical evidence.  We demonstrate that implied cost of capital differs from expected return, on average, by a function encompassing volatilities of, as well as correlation between, expected returns and cash flows, growth in cash flows, and leverage. These results provide alternative explanations for findings from empirical studies employing implied cost of capital on the magnitude of the market risk premium; predictability of future returns; and the relations between cost of capital and a host of firm characteristics, such as growth, leverage, idiosyncratic risk and the firm’s information environment.

 

Discussion of “On the relation between expected returns and implied cost of capital”

Richard Lambert

 

This paper discusses the paper “On the relationship between expected returns and implied cost of capital” by Hughes, Liu, and Liu.  The discussion focuses on developing the intuition behind the mathematical results and on extensions of the analysis that future research could address.

 

Explicit relative performance evaluation in performance-vested equity grants

Mary Ellen Carter, Christopher D. Ittner and Sarah L.C. Zechman

 

Using data from FTSE 350 firms, we examine factors influencing explicit relative performance evaluation (RPE) conditions in performance-vested equity grants.  We provide exploratory evidence on whether the use or characteristics of RPE are associated with efforts to improve incentives by removing common risk, other economic factors discussed in the RPE literature, or external pressure to implement RPE.  We find that many of these economic factors, including common risk reduction, are more closely related to specific relative performance conditions than to the firm-level decision to use RPE in some or all of their equity grants.  We also find that greater external monitoring by institutional investors or others is associated with plans with more stringent overall RPE conditions.  The relative performance conditions are binding in most RPE plans, with nearly two-thirds of the grants vesting only partially or not vesting at all.  And, we find evidence that vesting percentages vary in RPE and non-RPE plans.  

 

Discussion of “Explicit relative performance evaluation in performance-vested equity grants”

Fabrizio Ferri

 

Carter, Ittner, and Zechman (2009) examine the use of explicit relative performance evaluation (RPE) conditions in performance-vested equity plans in a sample of United Kingdom (U.K.) firms in 2002. They find that factors suggested by economic theories (for example, removal of common shocks, tournament theory) are more closely associated with specific features of the plan than with the firm-level decision to use an RPE equity plan. My discussion focuses on the interpretation of these findings and the opportunities and implications for future research. I also summarize the views of five U.K. directors who were involved in the design and use of performance-vested equity plans.

 

Dynamic performance measurement with intangible assets

Carlos Corona

 

The increasing importance of intangible assets in modern economies is driving companies to include measures of intangible assets in managerial performance evaluations. For the multiperiod principal-agent model analyzed in this paper, a manager must be motivated to invest in intangible assets like customer satisfaction or product quality. The intangible asset is not verifiable for contracting purposes, but the parties can rely on a noisy indicator of the current asset value. I derive a class of value added performance measures, which effectively aggregate the current cash flow and consecutive realizations of the noisy indicator of the intangible asset. This class of performance measures is shown to be optimal for different scenarios regarding contract commitment and observability of the actual investment decisions. Long-term contracts are examined as a baseline. However, in practice firms usually adopt shorter medium-term contracts that are periodically renegotiated. I show that this more realistic contracting scenario yields the same investment patterns and efficiency levels as those obtained under long-term commitment.

 

Discussion of “Dynamic performance measurement with intangible assets”

Sunil Dutta

 

Corona (2008) investigates the roles of nonfinancial performance indicators and long-term commitments in an incentive contracting setting. The paper develops a multiperiod agency model in which nonfinancial performance indicators are shown to be valuable in providing the agent with desirable incentives. The relative importance of nonfinancial measures depends on the level of commitment that the principal and the agent can sustain. While long-term contracts are more efficient than short-term contracts, the analysis shows that a sequence of overlapping medium-term contracts can be as efficient as long-term contracts. In this discussion, I provide a brief review of the related streams of literature and discuss the paper’s contributions to them. The discussion also illustrates the intuition behind the paper’s main findings through a simple example and raises questions for future research.

 

Are analysts’ earnings forecasts more accurate when accompanied by cash flow forecasts?

Andrew Call, Shuping Chen and Yen H. Tong

 

We examine whether analysts’ earnings forecasts are more accurate when they also issue cash flow forecasts.  We find that (i) analysts’ earnings forecasts issued together with cash flow forecasts are more accurate than those not accompanied by cash flow forecasts, and (ii) analysts’ earnings forecasts reflect a better understanding of the implications of current earnings for future earnings when they are accompanied by cash flow forecasts.  These results are consistent with analysts adopting a more structured and disciplined approach to forecasting earnings when they also issue cash flow forecasts.  Finally, we find that more accurate cash flow forecasts decrease the likelihood of analysts being fired, suggesting that cash flow forecast accuracy is relevant to analysts’ career outcomes.

 

Discussion of “Are analysts’ earnings forecasts more accurate when accompanied by cash flow forecasts?”

Reuven Lehavy

 

Call, Chen, and Tong (2009, Review of Accounting Studies, this issue) demonstrate that, relative to analysts who issue earnings but not cash flow forecasts, analysts who issue both forecasts (i) produce relatively more accurate earnings forecasts, (ii) have a better understanding of the persistence of current earnings, and (iii) are less likely to get fired. In my discussion, I highlight some general challenges facing research on analyst cash flow forecasts, demonstrate the diminishing difference in the relative accuracy over time (including its compete elimination by 2004), and examine the sensitivity of some of the evidence in Call et al. (2009) to the age of the forecast and to the presence of extreme bad-news earnings surprises.

The Robustness of the Sarbanes Oxley Effect on the U.S. capital market

Bowe Hansen, Grace Pownall and Xue Wang

 

We examine the incidence of new listings and delistings on U.S. stock exchanges and firms’ propensity to delist, as a function of general market conditions, firm fundamentals, and the costs of compliance with the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX). We find that both general market conditions and firm fundamentals explain the delisting incidence and firms’ delisting decisions; while SOX variables are positively associated with firms’ delisting likelihood only when general market conditions are not included in the analyses.  Further analyses on the population partitioned into size quintiles suggest that the passage of SOX was not associated with an increase in the likelihood of delisting for any size quintile of firms and that the implementation of SOX section 404 is positively associated with the delisting likelihood for midsized and larger firms.  Our empirical evidence is useful to regulators as they consider changes in the imposition and implementation of SOX section 404.

 

Discussion of “The Robustness of the Sarbanes Oxley Effect on the U.S. capital market”

Trevor Harris

 

In this paper, I use anecdotal evidence and logical reasoning to suggest that, despite the use of an extensive database, it is not possible to conclude that passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act did not have an impact on companies’ delisting decisions. Moreover, the instrumental variables used to proxy for SOX effects are too weak and suffer from a significant endogeneity problem given that passage of SOX was driven by many of the economic and control problems that are used to control for market and company factors. I also discuss some broader issues about the trade-off between large sample statistical inference and anecdotal analysis foraddressing practical questions.



Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 14, Number 1, March 2009


What drives the increased informativeness of earnings announcements over time?

Daniel W. Collins, Oliver Zhen Li and Hong Xie

 

How Does the Corporate Bond Market Value Capital Investments and Accruals

Sanjeev Bhojraj and Bhaskaran Swaminathan

 

Experimental Evidence of How Prior Experience as an Auditor Influences Managers' Strategic Reporting Decisions

Kendall O Bowlin, Jeffrey Hales and Steven J. Kachelmeier

 

Publicly-Traded versus Privately-Held: Implications for Conditional Conservatism in Bank Financial Reporting

D. Craig Nichols, Jim Wahlen and Matthew M. Wieland

 

Tightening Credit Standards: The Role of Accounting Quality

Philippe Jorion, Charles Shi and Sanjian Zhang

 

Accounting Conservatism and Corporate Governance

Juan Garcia Lara, Beatriz García Osma and Fernando Penalva


Abstracts

Volume 14, Number 1, March 2009


What drives the increased informativeness of earnings announcements over time?

Daniel W. Collins, Oliver Zhen Li and Hong Xie

 

Landsman and Maydew (J Acc Res 40:797–808, 2002) document that the information content of earnings announcements has increased over the past three decades, and Francis et al. (Acc Rev, 77:515–546, 2002) conclude that expanded concurrent disclosures in firms’ earnings announcements, especially the inclusion of detailed income statements, explain this increase. We posit and find that the temporal increase in the intensity of the market’s reaction to Street earnings offers a competing explanation for the Landsman and Maydew finding. We also find that expanded concurrent disclosure of GAAP-based information contributes to the temporal increase in the information content of earnings announcements. However, unlike Francis et al., we find that the temporal increase in concurrent balance sheet and cash flow statement information dominates concurrent income statement information once we control for Street earnings.

 

How Does the Corporate Bond Market Value Capital Investments and Accruals

Sanjeev Bhojraj and Bhaskaran Swaminathan

 

This paper examines whether the mispricing of accruals documented in equity markets extends to bond markets. The paper finds that corporate bonds of firms with high operating accruals underperform corporate bonds of firms with low operating accruals. In the first year after portfolio formation, the underperformance is 115 basis points using an accrual measure that includes capital investments and 93 basis points using an accrual measure that is based only on working capital investments. The Sharpe ratios of the zero-investment bond accrual portfolios are comparable to those of the corresponding zero-investment stock accrual portfolios. The results are also robust to risk adjustments based on both a factor model consisting of the Fama and French (J. Financial Econ 33 (1993) 3) stock and bond market factors and a characteristics model based on bond ratings and duration. Cross-sectional Fama–MacBeth regressions that use individual bond data and control for stock and bond issuances in addition to ratings and duration also confirm the time-series portfolio findings. Overall, our results reveal an accrual anomaly among bonds similar to that observed among stocks.

 

Experimental Evidence of How Prior Experience as an Auditor Influences Managers' Strategic Reporting Decisions

Kendall O Bowlin, Jeffrey Hales and Steven J. Kachelmeier

 

We design an experiment to examine the influence of audit experience on subsequent reporting decisions when auditors become managers of audited firms. In contrast to the independence issues that can arise when auditors and their clients are related by prior affiliation, we focus this study on the more common case in which auditors assume subsequent employment with other firms’ clients. In a bi-matrix experimental game that captures key features of the strategic tension between auditors and reporters, we find that reporters who have prior experience as an auditor, particularly the experience of having been a diligent auditor, are more sensitive to large penalties for aggressive reporting than are reporters whose experience is exclusively as a reporter. Our results suggest implications for regulators in predicting the effects of reporting penalties and for firms in considering the effects of CPA experience when hiring for reporting positions.

 

Publicly-Traded versus Privately-Held: Implications for Conditional Conservatism in Bank Financial Reporting

D. Craig Nichols, Jim Wahlen and Matthew M. Wieland

 

Compared with privately held banks, publicly traded banks face greater agency costs because of greater separation of ownership and control but enjoy greater benefits from access to the equity capital market. Differences in control and capital market access influence public versus private banks’ accounting. We predict and find that public banks exhibit greater degrees of conditional conservatism (asymmetric timeliness of the recognition of losses versus gains in accounting income) than private banks. We predict and find that public banks recognize more timely earnings declines, less timely earnings increases, and larger and more timely loan losses. Although public ownership gives managers greater ability and incentive to exercise income-increasing accounting, our findings show that the demand for conservatism dominates within public banks and that the demand for conservatism is greater among public banks than private banks. Our results provide insights for accounting and finance academics, bank managers, auditors, and regulators concerning the effects of ownership structure on conditional conservatism in banks’ financial reporting.

 

Tightening Credit Standards: The Role of Accounting Quality

Philippe Jorion, Charles Shi and Sanjian Zhang

 

Over the latest 20 years, the average credit rating of U.S. corporations has trended down. Blume et al. (1998, Journal of Finance, 53, 1389–1413.) attribute this trend to a tightening of credit standards by agencies. We reexamine the observed decreases in credit ratings in several ways. First, we show that this downward trend does not apply to speculative-grade issuers. Second, our analysis of investment-grade issuers suggests that the apparent tightening of standards can be attributed primarily to changes in accounting quality over time. After incorporating changing accounting quality, we find no evidence that rating agencies have tightened their credit standards.

 

Accounting Conservatism and Corporate Governance

Juan Garcia Lara, Beatriz García Osma and Fernando Penalva

 

We predict that firms with stronger corporate governance will exhibit a higher degree of accounting conservatism. Governance level is assessed using a composite measure that incorporates several internal and external characteristics. Consistent with our prediction, strong governance firms show significantly higher levels of conditional accounting conservatism. Our tests take into account the endogenous nature of corporate governance, and the results are robust to the use of several measures of conservatism (market-based and nonmarket-based). Our evidence is consistent with the direction of causality flowing from governance to conservatism, and not vice versa, indicating that governance and conservatism are not substitutes. Finally, we study the impact of earnings discretion on the sensitivity of earnings to bad news across governance structures. We find that, on average, strong-governance firms appear to use discretionary accruals to inform investors about bad news in a timelier manner.



Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 13, Issue 4, December 2008


Rewriting earnings history

Baruch Lev, Stephen G. Ryan and Min Wu

 

Tax incentives for inefficient executive pay and reward for luck

Robert F. Göx

 

Does acquirer cash level predict post-acquisition returns?

Derek K. Oler

 

The relevance of quantifiable audit qualifications in the valuation of IPOs

Dimitrios C. Ghicas, Afroditi Papadaki, Georgia Siougle and Theodore Sougiannis

 

Are executive stock option exercises driven by private information?

David Aboody, John Hughes, Jing Liu and Wei Su

 

Investor reactions to derivative use and outcomes

Lisa Koonce, Marlys Gascho Lipe and MaryLea McAnally


Abstracts

Volume 13, Issue 4, December 2008


Rewriting earnings history

Baruch Lev, Stephen G. Ryan and Min Wu

 

Research on the usefulness of financial information generally focuses on the innovation in the information examined, such as an earnings surprise or cash flow growth. Consequently, prior research sheds little light on the role of the rich historical record of financial information in users’ decision-making. Using a sample of published restatements of earnings, we show that the revision of the historical pattern of earnings, distinct from the magnitude of the restatement and its impact on current earnings, significantly affects investors’ decisions and predicts class action lawsuits. Specifically, we find that restatements that eliminate or shorten histories of earnings growth or positive earnings have significantly more adverse effects for investor valuations and the likelihood of lawsuits than other restatements. This evidence about the value-relevance of refreshing the historical record of earnings is pertinent to the FASB’s recent cautious expansion of the scope of circumstances that require a restatement of financial information in FAS 154.

 

Tax incentives for inefficient executive pay and reward for luck

Robert F. Göx

 

I study the economic consequences of tax deductibility limits on salaries for the design of incentive contracts. The analysis is based on an agency model in which the firm's cash flow is a function of the agent's effort and an observable random factor beyond the agent's control. According to my analysis, limiting the tax deductibility of fixed wages has two consequences. The principal rewards the agent on the basis of the observable random factor and adjusts the amount of performance-based pay in the optimal incentive contract. The new contract can have weaker or stronger work incentives than without the tax. The theoretical findings have implications for empirical compensation research. First, the analysis shows that reward for luck can be the optimal response to recent tax law changes, whereas earlier empirical literature has attributed this phenomenon to managerial entrenchment. Second, I demonstrate that a simple regression analysis that fails to control for separable measures of luck is likely to find an increased pay for performance sensitivity as a response to the introduction of tax deductibility limits on salaries even if the pay for performance sensitivity has actually declined.

 

Does acquirer cash level predict post-acquisition returns?

Derek K. Oler

 

This paper investigates whether an acquirer’s pre-announcement cash level can predict post-acquisition returns. Harford (1999, Journal of Finance, 54, 1969–1997) shows that some cash-rich acquirers have lower announcement period returns than other acquirers, suggesting the market partially anticipates poor future performance. This paper shows that the acquirer’s cash level is also strongly and negatively predictive of post-acquisition returns, indicating that the announcement response is incomplete. Post-acquisition return on net operating assets (RNOA) is significantly decreasing in acquirer cash, suggesting that the market responds to subsequent poor operating performance as it is reported. Overall, these results are consistent with the market’s inattention to a less prominent accounting signal (acquirer cash) but attentiveness to a more prominent accounting signal (RNOA), as proposed by Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003, Journal of Accounting Economics, 36, 337–386).

 

The relevance of quantifiable audit qualifications in the valuation of IPOs

Dimitrios C. Ghicas, Afroditi Papadaki, Georgia Siougle and Theodore Sougiannis

 

How useful are audit qualifications to financial statement users? We analyze a sample of 204 firms that went public at the Athens Stock Exchange over the period 1987–2002. For 149 of these firms, auditors report quantitative estimates of the amount by which assets are overstated and/or liabilities are understated in reported financial statements. We find that underwriters and their affiliated analysts do not incorporate the negative information provided by these qualifications into offer prices and earnings forecasts. Investors, however, appear to efficiently impound the negative implications of the audit qualifications into stock market prices within the first day of trading. The results suggest that underwriters tend to align their interests with the interests of their clients, the old stockholders, at the expense of the new stockholders. They also suggest that the practice of reporting quantifiable qualifications in audit reports is valuable to investors given that they are disclosed by an expert.

 

Are executive stock option exercises driven by private information?

David Aboody, John Hughes, Jing Liu and Wei Su

 

In this study, we investigate the extent to which exercise of executive stock options is based upon private information. Contrary to popular belief, we find that shares are held more than 30 days following over a quarter of options exercised. Partitioning the data, we find weak evidence that decisions to exercise and sell immediately are prompted by bad news and stronger evidence that decisions to exercise and hold for at least 30 days are prompted by good news. Enhancing the power of our tests by considering several factors important to exercise decisions, we find that the higher the opportunity costs of early exercise as measured by the time-value of options, the greater the trading profits to executives. We also find that the greater the disguise provided by incentives to diversify and consume as measured by the depth of options in the money, the greater the trading profits to executives who exercise and sell. Turning to non-exercise decisions, we find that a strategy of holding options rather than shares to exploit good news yields positive abnormal returns consistent with theoretical predictions in the absence of dividends.

 

Investor reactions to derivative use and outcomes

Lisa Koonce, Marlys Gascho Lipe and MaryLea McAnally

 

How do investors evaluate managers who choose to use or not use derivatives once the outcomes of those decisions become known? Different theories offer different predictions, and we test these in three experiments. Results show that investors are more satisfied with firm managers and assign a higher value to firms when managers use derivatives (that address firm risks) than when they do not. This result occurs even though we hold constant the economic differences typically present when comparing derivative use versus non-use (i.e., ex-ante risk and ex-post outcome), suggesting that investors reward those firms that use derivatives. Additional tests reveal that investors believe that firm managers who use derivatives in these situations exhibit a higher level of decision-making care than those who do not use derivatives. We also document that these inferences about greater decision-making care do not apply to the speculative use of derivatives. Overall, our study adds to our understanding of how investors judge companies who use derivatives, given the outcomes that result from such use.



Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 13, Issue 2/3, June/September 2008

This double issue contains papers presented at a conference entitled Uses of Accounting Data for Firm Valuation and Performance Measurement, which was held at the School of Accountancy, W.P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, in Tempe Arizona, in October 2007.


Editorial

Stanley Baiman

 

Is financial reporting shaped by equity markets or by debt markets? An international study of timeliness and conservatism

Ray Ball, Ashok J. Robin and Gil Sadka

 

Discussion of “Is financial reporting shaped by equity markets or by debt markets? An international study of timeliness and conservatism”

Steve Monahan

 

Executive stock-based compensation and firms’ cash payout: the role of shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences

David Aboody and Ron Kasznik

 

Discussion of “Executive stock-based compensation and firms’ cash payout: the role of shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences”

Terry Shevlin

 

On the relation between predictable market returns and predictable analyst forecast errors

John S. Hughes, Jing Liu and Wei Su

 

Discussion of “On the relation between predictable market returns and predictable analyst forecast errors”

Gerald T. Garvey

 

Evidence of differing market responses to beating analysts' targets through tax expense decreases

Cristi A. Gleason and Lillian F. Mills

 

Discussion of “Evidence of differing market responses to beating analysts' targets through tax expense decreases”

Theodore E. Christensen

 

Investor recognition and stock returns

Reuven Lehavy and Richard G. Sloan

 

Discussion of “Investor recognition and stock returns”

Eli Bartov

 

Inventory policy, accruals quality and information risk

Gopal Krishnan, Bin Srinidhi and Lixin Su

 

Discussion of “Inventory policy, accruals quality and information risk”

Per Olsson


Abstracts

Volume 13, Issue 2/3, June/September 2008

This double issue contains papers presented at a conference entitled Uses of Accounting Data for Firm Valuation and Performance Measurement, which was held at the School of Accountancy, W.P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, in Tempe Arizona, in October 2007.


Is financial reporting shaped by equity markets or by debt markets? An international study of timeliness and conservatism

Ray Ball, Ashok J. Robin and Gil Sadka

 

We hypothesize debt markets—not equity markets—are the primary influence on “association” metrics studied since Ball and Brown (1968 J Account Res 6:159–178). Debt markets demand high scores on timeliness, conservatism and Lev’s (1989 J Account Res 27(supplement):153–192) R 2, because debt covenants utilize reported numbers. Equity markets do not rate financial reporting consistently with these metrics, because (among other things) they control for the total information incorporated in prices. Single-country studies shed little light on debt versus equity influences, in part because within-country firms operate under a homogeneous reporting regime. International data are consistent with our hypothesis. This is a fundamental issue in accounting.

 

Discussion of “Is financial reporting shaped by equity markets or by debt markets? An international study of timeliness and conservatism”

Steve Monahan

 

Using country-level data, Ball et al. (2008, Review of Accounting Studies) (BRS hereafter) demonstrate that debt-market (equity-market) size is (is not) positively associated with measures of timely loss recognition and asymmetric timely loss recognition. They argue that these results imply that debt holders—not equity holders—are the primary source of demand for timely accounting reports. They also argue that their results support the notion that the “costly contracting” school of thought is more descriptive than the “value relevance” perspective and that general purpose financial statements are of questionable value. I argue that, while their results are novel and relevant to both academia and practice, their conclusions are premature for at least three reasons (1) their research design is inefficient and may lead to biased inferences, (2) additional evidence on the relation between timeliness and the benefits of leverage as well as debt-instrument attributes is needed, and (3) factors other than timeliness also impact the quality of financial reporting and thus may be of value to equity holders or other interested parties.

 

Executive stock-based compensation and firms’ cash payout: the role of shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences

David Aboody and Ron Kasznik

 

We hypothesize that the structure of executive stock-based compensation helps to align managers’ payout choices with shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences. Specifically, stock options, which are not dividend-protected, can deter self-interested executives from using dividends as a form of payout. In contrast, restricted stock, which is dividend-protected, is more likely to induce the use of dividends. Relatedly, shareholders’ preferences for dividends, which are taxed as ordinary income, can depend on the income tax consequences of dividends relative to those of long-term capital gains. To test our hypothesis, we investigate whether the exogenous changes in shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences following the 2003 dividend tax rate reduction result in predictable shifts in executive stock-based compensation and in managers’ payout choices. Consistent with our prediction, we find a positive relation between the increased use of dividends in firms’ payouts and the increased (decreased) use of restricted stock (stock options) in executive compensation, particularly for firms with a greater percentage ownership by individual investors and with lower costs associated with modifying the structure of their compensation plans. Our investigation of the role of shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences in the design of executive stock-based compensation extends the prior literature that has largely focused on the role of incentive contracts in inducing managerial effort, risk taking, and retention.

 

Discussion of “Executive stock-based compensation and firms’ cash payout: the role of shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences”

Terry Shevlin

 

Aboody and Kasznik (Rev Acc Stud, this issue, 2008) develop and test cross-sectional predictions about how firms might respond to the 2003 dividend tax cuts. My discussion suggests some alternative firm responses, a restructuring of the main tests to be consistent with the theory and predictions, and an interpretation of the magnitude of the observed associations. Overall, the paper addresses an interesting issue, recognizes that executive compensation is endogenous in this event, and adds to the long literature on dividend payout policy.

 

On the relation between predictable market returns and predictable analyst forecast errors

John S. Hughes, Jing Liu and Wei Su

 

We investigate the relation between predictable market returns and predictable analyst forecast errors. Perfect correlation between predictable components of forecast errors and abnormal returns would lend credence to the view that pricing anomalies are not merely an artifact of inadequately controlled risk. Our evidence implies an imperfect correlation. Moreover, we find that while the predictable component of abnormal returns is significantly associated with future forecast errors, trading strategies based directly on the predictable component of forecast errors are not profitable. Further implications of our findings are that predictable components of analysts’ forecast errors are robust with respect to loss functions and analysts’ earnings forecasts may significantly diverge from the market expectations.

 

Discussion of “On the relation between predictable market returns and predictable analyst forecast errors”

Gerald T. Garvey

 

This paper furthers our understanding of two major issues in financial accounting.  Most directly, the results undermine the validity of using analyst earnings forecasts as proxies for market expectations.  The paper’s main results are also informative about the relative reliability of some well-known return anomalies.

 

Evidence of differing market responses to beating analysts' targets through tax expense decreases

Cristi A. Gleason and Lillian F. Mills

 

Returns are positive when firms meet or beat analysts’ consensus forecasts, but negative when firms miss. Prior research finds little substantial discount for managing earnings to beat the forecasts via accruals generally. We consider whether the market reward for beating the forecast is smaller when firms use tax expense decreases, which are visible and transparent at the earnings announcement date, unlike accruals. When firms beat analysts’ forecasts by decreasing their tax expense relative to the third-quarter rate, the market discounts the reward by an economically significant amount: approximately 86%. We document lower persistence of current-year tax changes for those firms that decrease tax expense to beat the target. The observed discount for beating the forecast only because of a third to fourth quarter tax decrease may reflect market perceptions of the lack of persistence of the decrease.

 

Discussion of “Evidence of differing market responses to beating analysts' targets through tax expense decreases”

Theodore E. Christensen

 

Gleason and Mills (2008) extend prior research investigating whether investors detect obvious earnings management.  They improve on previous efforts to answer this question by examining firms with a clear motivation to manage earnings and by investigating a specific earnings management tool.  They investigate firms that fall short of analysts’ expectations when income tax expense is based on the third quarter effective tax rate but meet expectations by reducing the fourth quarter tax expense below predicted tax expense.  Their results suggest that investors are sophisticated enough to identify a transparent earnings management tool and that they discount the fact that firms meet expectations using such an obvious tactic.  Specifically, the authors find evidence suggesting that the reward for meeting analysts’ expectations is 86 percent lower when managers use the tax expense as an earnings management tool to meet expectations.  The puzzling feature of their results is that, although it is diminished, investors still reward firms for meeting expectations when they can only do so through an apparently obvious manipulation of tax expense. 

 

Investor recognition and stock returns

Reuven Lehavy and Richard G. Sloan

 

It is well established that investment fundamentals, such as earnings and cash flows, can explain only a small proportion of the variation in stock returns. We find that investor recognition of a firm’s stock can explain relatively more of the variation in stock returns. Consistent with Merton’s (J Finance 42(3):483–510, 1987) theoretical analysis, we show that (i) contemporaneous stock returns are positively related to changes in investor recognition, (ii) future stock returns are negatively related to changes in investor recognition, (iii) the above relations are stronger for stocks with greater idiosyncratic risk and (iv) corporate investment and financing activities are both positively related to changes in investor recognition. Our research suggests that investors and managers who are concerned with firm valuation should consider investor recognition in addition to accounting information and related investment fundamentals.

 

Discussion of “Investor recognition and stock returns”

Eli Bartov

 

Lehavy and Sloan (2008, Review of Accounting Studies) note that prior studies find that earnings and cash flows explain only a small portion of the cross-sectional variation in stock return. This motivates them to investigate empirically the ability of a behavioral model of capital market equilibrium proposed by Merton (1987, Journal of Finance, 42, 483–510) to explain the remaining variation in stock returns. Their primary findings show that security value is, as predicted, increasing in investor recognition of the security and that investor recognition is incremental to and more important than cash flows in explaining the cross-sectional variation of stock returns. While the research question is intriguing and well motivated, a number of methodological limitations may limit the reliability of the findings/interpretations. In this paper, I first evaluate the motivation and potential contribution of the Lehavy and Sloan (2008) study. I then outline methodological limitations underlying the study and offer ways of overcoming them. In the final section, I state my conclusions.

 

Inventory policy, accruals quality and information risk

Gopal Krishnan, Bin Srinidhi and Lixin Su

 

This paper provides evidence consistent with firms with Last-in-first-out (LIFO) inventory policy being priced by the market as having lower information risk than First-in-first-out (FIFO) firms. Furthermore, the paper shows that this pricing differential is sustained after controlling for accruals quality, suggesting that the inventory policy signals some information risk characteristics that are not captured by accruals quality measure. We investigate the relation between inventory policy and accruals quality and find that accruals quality is systematically worse for FIFO firms than for LIFO firms after controlling for correlated omitted variables and known firm attributes. These findings complement the currently established relationship between the cost of capital, market pricing and accruals quality by focusing on the need for understanding the incremental effects of individual accounting policies.

 

Discussion of “Inventory policy, accruals quality and information risk”

Per Olsson

 

Krishnan, Srinidhi, and Su (2008) investigate how the choice of LIFO vs. FIFO affects firms’ accruals quality and cost of capital.  The authors show that LIFO firms have better accruals quality and lower cost of capital than FIFO firms and that the cost of capital effect associated with the inventory valuation method is not subsumed by differences either in fundamental risk or accruals quality between LIFO and FIFO firms.  This discussion is focused on key design choices and underlying assumptions.



Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 13, Issue 1, March 2008


Voluntary disclosure of accruals in earnings press releases and the pricing of accruals

Shai Levi

 

An integrated analysis of the association between accrual disclosure and the abnormal accrual barrier

Henock Louis, Dahlia Robinson and Andrew M. Sbaraglia

 

The hiring of accounting and finance officers from audit firms:  how did the market react?

Marshall A. Geiger, Clive S. Lennox and David S. North

 

GAAP goodwill and debt contracting efficiency:  evidence from net-worth covenants

Richard M. Frankel, Chandra Seethamraju and Tzachi Zach

 

Performance measurement manipulation:  cherry-picking what to correct

Anil Arya and Jonathan Glover

 

Market reactions to the disclosure of internal control weaknesses and to the characteristics of those weaknesses under section 302 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002

Jacqueline S. Hammersley, Linda A. Myers and Catherine Shakespeare


Abstracts
Volume 13, Issue 1, March 2008


Voluntary disclosure of accruals in earnings press releases and the pricing of accruals

Shai Levi

 

This study investigates firms’ decisions to disclose accruals information in earnings press releases versus to provide it only in 10-Q filings and the impact of this disclosure on the pricing of accruals. I find that firms disclose accruals in their press releases when earnings alone are a weak indication of cash flow performance and that following these disclosures the accruals information is fully impounded into stock prices. The evidence suggests that when investor demand for accruals is likely to exist and firms disclose the information in earnings press releases, the mispricing typically associated with accruals is mitigated.

 

An integrated analysis of the association between accrual disclosure and the abnormal accrual barrier

Henock Louis, Dahlia Robinson and Andrew M. Sbaraglia

 

We find no evidence of accrual mispricing for firms that disclose accrual information at earnings announcements. For these firms, the market differentiates the discretionary from the nondiscretionary components of the earnings surprise. In contrast, the market fails to distinguish between the discretionary and the nondiscretionary components of the earnings surprise for firms that do not disclose accrual information at earnings announcements. These firms experience some stock price correction around the filing date. However, the correction is only partial, resulting in a post-filing drift.

 

The hiring of accounting and finance officers from audit firms:  how did the market react?

Marshall A. Geiger, Clive S. Lennox and David S. North

 

This study investigates the market’s reaction to companies hiring accounting and finance officers directly from their external audit firms—the auditor-to-client hiring practice referred to as the “revolving door.” The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) eliminated this hiring practice, reflecting concerns that such appointments may impair audit and financial reporting quality. However, it was also argued that companies may have benefited from hiring individuals already familiar with their systems, organization and personnel. To determine the prevalence of this hiring practice and how shareholders viewed these appointments, we examine 3-day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcements of newly appointed accounting and finance officers over the period 1985–2002. We find that the proportion of revolving door hires is relatively low (only 6.1% of all hires in our sample), but that when they did occur the market valued the revolving door appointments more positively than other appointments. Further tests reveal that the positive market reaction to revolving door appointments is driven mainly by smaller companies, and that these appointments are not associated with lower financial reporting quality when assessing subsequent discretionary accruals or the receipt of an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER). Overall, the low frequency of occurrence, investors’ positive perceptions, and the lack of association with deteriorated reporting quality indicate that the SOX restriction on revolving door appointments may have been unnecessary and will do little to protect shareholders.

 

GAAP goodwill and debt contracting efficiency:  evidence from net-worth covenants

Richard M. Frankel, Chandra Seethamraju and Tzachi Zach

 

We study the role of goodwill in promoting contracting efficiency and the effect of SFAS 141 and 142 on this role. We provide three main results. First, when a lending agreement contains some type of minimum net-worth covenant, the probability of a tangible net-worth covenant is decreasing in the borrower’s goodwill. Second, the use of tangible net-worth covenants has increased since the promulgation of SFAS 141 and 142. Finally, covenant slack is not significantly related to the use of tangible net-worth covenants relative to net-worth covenants. These results suggest that contracting parties realize efficiency gains by permitting borrowers’ actions to be restricted by the value of GAAP goodwill. However, recent changes in GAAP have reduced the contracting usefulness of goodwill.

 

Performance measurement manipulation:  cherry-picking what to correct

Anil Arya and Jonathan Glover

 

A common feature of managerial and financial reporting is an iterative process wherein various parties selectively correct particular measurements by challenging them and subjecting them to increased scrutiny. We model this feature by adding an agent appeal stage to the standard moral hazard model and show that it can be optimal to allow the agent to decide which performance measures to appeal, despite the agent’s incentive to cherry-pick. In the presence of measurement errors, the agent is incentivized by increased opportunities for cherry-picking that arise if he chooses the “right” vs. the “wrong” acts.

 

Market reactions to the disclosure of internal control weaknesses and to the characteristics of those weaknesses under section 302 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002

Jacqueline S. Hammersley, Linda A. Myers and Catherine Shakespeare

 

We examine the stock price reaction to management’s disclosure of internal control weaknesses under §302 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act and to the characteristics of these weaknesses, controlling for other material announcements in the event window. We find that some characteristics of the weaknesses—their severity, management’s conclusion regarding the effectiveness of the controls, their auditability, and the vagueness of the disclosures—are informative. We also find that the information content of internal control weakness disclosures depends on the severity of the internal control weakness. Moreover, in a sub-sample uncontaminated by other announcements in the event window, we find negative price reactions to the disclosure of internal control weaknesses and material weaknesses



Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 12, Issue 4, December 2007


Economic consequences of financial reporting changes: diluted EPS and contingent convertible securities

Carol A. Marquardt and Christine I. Wiedman

 

An alternative interpretation of the discontinuity in earnings distributions

William Beaver, Maureen F. McNichols and Karen Nelson

 

An evaluation of SFAS No. 130 comprehensive income disclosures

Dennis J. Chambers, Thomas J. Linsmeier, Catherine Shakespeare and Theodore Sougiannis

 

Disagreement over the persistence of earnings components: evidence on the properties of management-specific adjustments to GAAP earnings

Young-Soo Choi, Stephen W. Lin, Martin Walker and Steven Young

 

Financial statement effects of adopting international accounting standards: the case of Germany

Mingyi Hung and K.R. Subramanyam

 

Make or buy new technology: the role of CEO compensation contract in a firm’s route to innovation

Yanfeng Xue


Abstracts
Volume 12, Issue 4, December 2007


Economic consequences of financial reporting changes: diluted EPS and contingent convertible securities

Carol A. Marquardt and Christine I. Wiedman

 

This paper examines the economic consequences of changes in the financial reporting requirements for contingent convertible securities (COCOs). Using a sample of 199 COCO issuers from 2000 to 2004, we find that issuers are more likely to restructure or redeem existing COCOs to obtain more favorable accounting treatment when the financial reporting impact on diluted earnings per share (EPS) is greater and when EPS is used as a performance metric in CEO bonus contracts. These results provide new evidence that managers are willing to incur costs to retain perceived financial reporting and compensation benefits. We also present evidence of significantly negative stock returns around event dates associated with the financial reporting changes, consistent with investor anticipation of the agency costs associated with the rule change.

 

An alternative interpretation of the discontinuity in earnings distributions

William Beaver, Maureen F. McNichols and Karen Nelson

 

We show that the asymmetric effects of income taxes and special items for profit and loss firms contribute to a discontinuity at zero in the distribution of earnings.  Income taxes draw profit observations towards zero while negative special items pull loss observations away from zero.  These earnings components are thus expected to contribute to a discontinuity even in the absence of discretion.  We show our results are not an artifact of deflation and that other common components of earnings do not have similar effects on the earnings distribution around zero.

 

An evaluation of SFAS No. 130 comprehensive income disclosures

Dennis J. Chambers, Thomas J. Linsmeier, Catherine Shakespeare and Theodore Sougiannis

 

In this study, we provide evidence on the pricing of other comprehensive income (OCI) that differs from most evidence in prior research. Prior archival research has largely concluded that OCI is not priced by investors. In contrast, we provide evidence in the post-SFAS 130 period that OCI is priced on a dollar-for-dollar basis as is predicted by economic theory for transitory income items. We attribute this finding to our use of post-SFAS 130 as-reported measures of OCI rather than pre-SFAS 130 as-if estimates of OCI measures. Furthermore, we document that two components of OCI, foreign currency translation adjustment and unrealized gains/losses on available-for-sale securities, are priced by investors. In the post-SFAS 130 period, we also find that the type of financial statement in which firms report OCI and its components affects pricing, consistent with the conclusions of prior experimental research. However, our evidence suggests that investors pay greater attention to OCI information reported in the statement of changes in equity, rather than in a statement of financial performance. This could be attributed to investors becoming more familiar in the post-SFAS 130 period with the predominant reporting of OCI and its components in the statement of changes in equity. These findings may be relevant to both the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the International Accounting Standards Board, which jointly are undertaking a new project that, in part, is addressing financial statement presentation of OCI items.

 

Disagreement over the persistence of earnings components: evidence on the properties of management-specific adjustments to GAAP earnings

Young-Soo Choi, Stephen W. Lin, Martin Walker and Steven Young

 

We examine disagreement between management and Thomson Datastream over the persistence of earnings components. Using income statement and footnote disclosures, we identify the source and properties of disputed items. Disagreements typically reflect opaque reporting practices (for example, in the case of transitory operating items) and restrictive classification rules (for example, in the case of discontinued operations). Incremental and relative value relevance tests suggest that the majority of management-specific adjustments reflect appropriate classification of earnings components by insiders. Nevertheless, evidence consistent with strategic disclosure does emerge for a subset of management adjustments. 

 

 

Financial statement effects of adopting international accounting standards: the case of Germany

Mingyi Hung and K.R. Subramanyam

 

Using a sample of German firms, we investigate the financial statement effects of adopting International Accounting Standards (IAS) during 1998 through 2002. We find that total assets and book value of equity, as well as variability of book value and income, are significantly higher under IAS than under German GAAP (HGB). In addition, book value and income are no more value relevant under IAS than HGB, and HGB (IAS) income is highly persistent (transitory). Finally, we find weak evidence that IAS income exhibits greater conditional conservatism than HGB income. Our results are consistent with the fair-value (income smoothing) orientation of IAS (HGB).

 

Make or buy new technology: the role of CEO compensation contract in a firm’s route to innovation

Yanfeng Xue

 

A firm’s board of directors, based on its risk tolerance or “appetite,” sets the corporate objectives. It is then the management’s job to meet the objectives by adopting appropriate strategies. However, the board can design compensation policies to encourage desired management strategy choices. This paper explores the extent to which management compensation policies are aligned with strategy choices for obtaining new technology. Firms obtain new technology either through internal R&D or through acquisitions, often labeled “make” and “buy” strategies, respectively. The “make” strategy is inherently more risky, with much of the high risk idiosyncratic. Furthermore, U.S. GAAP requires that R&D expenditures be expensed but allows capitalization of acquisition costs, thus a firm using the “make” as opposed to the “buy” strategy will experience a greater negative effect on accounting earnings. I hypothesize that these differences will lead risk-averse and utility-maximizing managers to implement the “buy” strategy if their compensation is heavily weighted on accounting-based performance measures. Conversely, managers with more stock-based compensation, especially stock options, are more likely to choose to develop new technology internally. Using data from U.S. high-tech industries and a simultaneous equations regression framework, I find evidence consistent with the above hypotheses.

 



Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 12, Issue 2/3, June/September 2007

This double issue contains papers presented at a conference entitled, European-American Conference on Accounting Research, which was held at INSEAD in Fontainebleau, France in September 2006.


Editorial

Stanley Baiman

 

Biases in Multi-Year Management Financial Forecasts: Evidence from Private Venture-Backed U.S. Companies

Christopher Armstrong, Antonio Davila, George Foster and John R.M. Hand

 

Discussion of “Biases in Multi-Year Management Financial Forecasts: Evidence from Private Venture-Backed U.S. Companies”

Elizabeth Anne Demers

 

Using Accounting Information for Consumption Planning and Equity Valuation

Kenton K Yee

 

Discussion of “Using Accounting Information for Consumption Planning and Equity Valuation”

Peter Ove Christensen

 

Another Look at GAAP versus The Street: An Empirical Assessment of Measurement Error Bias

Daniel A Cohen, Rebecca N Hann and Maria Ogneva

 

Discussion of “Another Look at GAAP versus The Street: An Empirical Assessment of Measurement Error Bias”

Theodore E. Christensen

 

Conservatism, Growth and Return on Investment

Madhav Rajan, Stefan Reichelstein and Mark Soliman

 

Discussion of “Conservatism, Growth and Return on Investment”

Frøystein Gjesdal

 

Investor Protection and Analysts’ Cash Flow Forecasts Around the World

Mark L. DeFond and Mingyi Hung

 

Discussion of “Investor Protection and Analysts’ Cash Flow Forecasts Around the World”

Luzi Hail

 

How Disclosure Quality Affects the Level of Information Asymmetry
Stephen Brown and Stephen A Hillegeist

 

Discussion of “How Disclosure Quality Affects the Level of Information Asymmetry”
Yonca Ertimur


Abstracts
Volume 12, Issue 2/3, June/September 2007

This double issue contains papers presented at a conference  entitled, European-American Conference on Accounting Research, which was held at INSEAD in Fontainebleau, France in September 2006.


Biases in Multi-Year Management Financial Forecasts: Evidence from Private Venture-Backed U.S. Companies

Christopher Armstrong, Antonio Davila, George Foster and John R.M. Hand

 

This paper studies the properties and determinants of managers’ multi-year financial forecasts.  Using one- to five-year-ahead forecasts reported by private venture-backed firms, we ask whether, by how much, and why biases in managers’ forecasts of revenues, expenses and profits depend on the forecasting horizon and the verifiability of assets.  We find that profitability forecasts contain a strategic component, in that [1] one-year-ahead revenue (expense) forecasts are slightly and asymmetrically pessimistic (optimistic), while five-year-ahead forecasts are hugely and asymmetrically optimistic (pessimistic); and [2] biases in revenue and expense forecasts are larger, the harder to verify or more intangible-intensive are firms’ assets.

 

Discussion of “Biases in Multi-Year Management Financial Forecasts: Evidence from Private Venture-Backed U.S. Companies”

Elizabeth Anne Demers

 

Armstrong, Dávila, Foster, and Hand (“ADFH”) use a proprietary venture capital database of revenue and profit projections submitted by young firms seeking financing to attempt to address a number of questions related to forecasts by managers of early stage, venture-backed, private entrepreneurial firms. The proprietary dataset together with the creative use of a “historically-grounded conditional projections” methodology are the most interesting features of ADFH’s study. However, these same aspects give rise to empirical design constraints that the study does not fully overcome. In addition, there are numerous leaps of logic required to arrive at some of ADFH’s conclusions and there are alternative explanations for ADFH’s findings that have not been entirely refuted. This leaves the reader with some doubt as to whether all of ADFH’s conclusions are fully substantiated. Nevertheless, the evidence presented makes an interesting contribution to our understanding of the forecasting behavior of young, private, rapidly growing, VCbacked firms, and provides some natural economic and methodological leads into further studies of these issues.

 

Using Accounting Information for Consumption Planning and Equity Valuation

Kenton K Yee

 

This article develops a consumption-based valuation model that treats earnings and cash flow as complementary information sources. The model integrates three ideas that do not appear in traditional valuation models: (i) earnings provide information about future shocks to cash flow; (ii) earnings contain indiscernible transient accruals; and (iii) investors use cash flow and earnings to make allocation and consumption decisions and set price.  Accordingly, the quality of earnings affects production and consumption as well as price.  Among other implications, the model reveals that a valuation coefficient is not just a capitalization factor; it is the product of a capitalization factor and a structural factor reflecting earnings quality and accounting bias.

 

Discussion of “Using Accounting Information for Consumption Planning and Equity Valuation”

Peter Ove Christensen

 

This paper discusses Yee (2007), who investigates the role of accounting information for consumption planning and equity valuation. Higher earnings quality increases investor welfare and ex ante stock prices as well as the weight on earnings in valuation equations based on both cash flows and earnings. The former is due to improved consumption smoothing through more informed production choices, while the latter is due to the impact on the relative information content of current cash flows versus earnings about future cash flows.

 

Another Look at GAAP versus The Street: An Empirical Assessment of Measurement Error Bias

Daniel A Cohen, Rebecca N Hann and Maria Ogneva

 

Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) document a significant increase in the difference between the earnings response coefficients (ERCs) for GAAP and Street (I/B/E/S) earnings over the 1990s, suggesting that the market has become increasingly reliant or fixated on Street earnings. In this study we investigate whether, alternatively, an “errors in variables” problem caused by a mismatch between the definitions of realized and expected earnings drives the ERC divergence. Our findings suggest that results from conventional analyses of GAAP and Street ERCs, including the ERC divergence pattern, are significantly contaminated by measurement errors in earnings surprises.

 

Discussion of “Another Look at GAAP versus The Street: An Empirical Assessment of Measurement Error Bias”

Theodore E. Christensen

 

Cohen, Hann, and Ogneva [(2007) Review of Accounting Studies, Forthcoming] provide evidence on how measurement error affects inferences this literature. In particular, they provide a theoretical framework for understanding (1) the source of differences in market reactions to GAAP and Street earnings and (2) why we observe a divergence over time between ERCs based on these two earnings metrics. Moreover, they present empirical evidence on practical solutions researchers can use to mitigate the effects of measurement error. I discuss the implications of their results and provide new empirical evidence to highlight how their results apply to future research. In particular, I use a large sample of manager-adjusted “pro forma” earnings numbers voluntarily disclosed in quarterly earnings press releases to provide additional evidence about the implications of their research. Descriptive statistics based on these data illustrate the degree of measurement error in different earnings metrics. The results suggest that additional research is needed to determine the extent to which a random walk earnings expectation and reverse regression can mitigate the effects of measurement error.

 

Conservatism, Growth and Return on Investment

Madhav Rajan, Stefan Reichelstein and Mark Soliman

 

Return on Investment (ROI) is widely regarded as a key measure of firm profitability.  The accounting literature has long recognized that ROI will generally not reflect economic profitability, as determined by the internal rate of return (IRR) of a firm’s investment projects.  In particular, it has been noted that accounting conservatism may result in an upward bias of ROI, relative to the underlying IRR.  We examine both theoretically and empirically the behavior of ROI as a function of two variables:  past growth in new investments and accounting conservatism.  Higher growth is shown to result in lower levels of ROI provided the accounting is conservative, while the opposite is generally true for liberal accounting policies.  Conversely, more conservative accounting will increase ROI provided growth in new investments has been “moderate” over the relevant horizon, while the opposite is true if new investments grew at sufficiently high rates.  Taken together, we find that conservatism and growth are “substitutes” in their joint impact on ROI. 

 

Discussion of “Conservatism, Growth and Return on Investment”

Frøystein Gjesdal

 

Providing data for the measurement of financial performance is a key objective of financial reporting. Rajan, Reichelstein, and Soliman (2007, Conservatism, growth and return on investment, Review of Accounting Studies, this issue) provide new insights into the well known biases involved in measuring return on investment (ROI) on the basis of accrual accounting. They analyze the relationships among ROIs, growth rates, accrual policies and cash flow profiles in a fairly general steadystate model (only the last parameter is severely restricted). New and interesting results outside steady-state are presented as well. In the empirical part of the paper Rajan et al. demonstrate that the biases involved are systematic and economically significant. Hence empiricists must pay attention (whatever their sample sizes). Hopefully this paper will generate renewed interest in the analytical aspects of accrual accounting.

 

Investor Protection and Analysts’ Cash Flow Forecasts Around the World

Mark L. DeFond and Mingyi Hung

 

We find that analysts are more likely to provide cash flow forecasts in countries with weak investor protection institutions, suggesting that market participants demand (and analysts supply) cash flow information when earnings are less likely to reflect underlying economic performance.  Consistently, we also find that analysts are more likely to provide cash flow forecasts in countries where earnings are more likely to be managed and have less value relevance.  Overall, our results suggest that information intermediaries respond to market-based incentives to help investors attenuate the adverse affects of institutional factors on earnings’ usefulness.  These findings contribute to the literature by shedding light on the institutional determinants of analysts’ research activities, and on the nature of the financial information they generate. 

 

Discussion of “Investor Protection and Analysts’ Cash Flow Forecasts Around the World”

Luzi Hail

 

DeFond and Hung [DeFond, M., & Hung, M. (2007). Review of Accounting Studies, 12 (this issue)] test the conjecture whether financial analysts, due to demand-side pressure, compensate for the limited usefulness of reported earnings by issuing cash flow forecasts. They find that analysts supplement their earnings forecasts more frequently with cash flow forecasts in countries where antidirector rights and legal enforcement quality are poor. In my discussion, I examine their hypothesis development and empirical research design and try to extend their arguments to a time-series setting. As it turns out, the paper’s main contention critically hinges on two assumptions: (1) investors’ unsatisfied demand for accounting information and (2) their willingness to rely on cash flow forecasts as valuable information signals. The descriptive validity of these assumptions in an international context is a priori not obvious. I then test whether substantial changes in investor protection and/or earnings quality relate to changes in the frequency of cash flow forecasts. My analyses show that analysts’ propensity to issue cash flow forecasts increases after the first prosecution under insider trading laws, after non-U.S. firms have cross-listed their shares on a U.S. exchange, or after firms have voluntarily replaced their domestic accounting standards with IFRS or U.S. GAAP. Thus, I conclude that the reasoning behind the levels results does not simply extend to a changes setting.

 

How Disclosure Quality Affects the Level of Information Asymmetry
Stephen Brown and Stephen A Hillegeist

 

We examine two potential mechanisms through which disclosure quality is expected to reduce information asymmetry: (1) altering the trading incentives of informed and uninformed investors so that there is relatively less trading by privately informed investors, and (2) reducing the likelihood that investors discover and trade on private information. Our results indicate that the negative relation between disclosure quality and information asymmetry is primarily caused by the latter mechanism. While information asymmetry is negatively associated with the quality of the annual report and investor relations activities, it is positively associated with quarterly report disclosure quality. Additionally, we hypothesize and find that that the negative association between disclosure quality and information asymmetry is stronger in settings characterized by high levels of firm-investor asymmetry.

 

Discussion of “How Disclosure Quality Affects the Level of Information Asymmetry”
Yonca Ertimur

 

Brown and Hillegeist (2007) examine how disclosure quality relates to information asymmetry. Specifically, the authors show that the negative association between the overall quality of a firm’s disclosures and the average level of information asymmetry is primarily driven by the negative association between disclosure quality and the frequency of information events. My discussion focuses on issues surrounding proxies for information asymmetry and disclosure quality the authors use. I also suggest some venues for future research.

 



Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 12, Issue 1, March 2007


Performance Measurement for Investment: Decisions under Capital Constraints

Alwine Mohnen and Moshe Bareket

 

Underwriter Choice and Earnings Management: Evidence from Seasoned Equity Offerings

Yongtae Kim, Hoje Jo and Myung Seok Park

Valuation of Loss Firms in a Knowledge-Based Economy
Masako Darrough and Jianming (Jim) Ye

Asymmetric Timeliness Tests of Accounting Conservatism
J Richard Dietrich, Karl A. Muller and Edward Riedl
 
Demand for the Truth in Principal-Agent Relationships
Joshua Ronen and Varda Lewinstein Yaari

Managerial Discretion and the Economic Determinants of the Disclosed Volatility Parameter for Valuing ESOs
Eli Bartov, Partha S. Mohanram and Doron Nissim



Abstracts
Volume 12, Issue 1, March 2007


Performance Measurement for Investment: Decisions under Capital Constraints

Alwine Mohnen and Moshe Bareket

 

An owner delegates investment decisions to a better informed manager whose time preferences are unknown to the owner. Due to exogenous capital constraints, not all profitable projects can be undertaken, and therefore the owner wants the manager to select the NPV-maximizing set of projects. We show that the relative benefit cost allocation scheme proposed by prior literature does not solve this problem. Adopting the same information structure as in Rogerson (1997) and Reichelstein (1997), we demonstrate how to obtain robust goal congruence using residual income. The resulting revenue recognition and cost allocation rules lead to a performance measure reflecting the expected NPV-ranking of projects in each and every period.

 

Underwriter Choice and Earnings Management: Evidence from Seasoned Equity Offerings

Yongtae Kim, Hoje Jo and Myung Seok Park

 

Using a sample of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), this paper examines the association between the choice of financial intermediary and earnings management. We contend that with more stringent standards for certification and intense monitoring, highly prestigious underwriters restrict firms’ incentives for earnings management to protect their reputation and to avoid potential litigation risks, while firms with greater incentives for earnings management avoid strict monitoring by choosing low-quality underwriters. Consistent with our predictions, we find an inverse association between underwriter quality and issuers’ earnings management. In addition, we find that underwriter quality is positively related to SEOs’ post-issue performance, even after controlling for the effect of earnings management. We also find that firms with low underwriter prestige and high levels of earnings management under-perform the most. However, the effect of underwriter choice on post-issue performance does not last long.

 

Valuation of Loss Firms in a Knowledge-Based Economy
Masako Darrough and Jianming (Jim) Ye

Recent research in accounting has documented a substantial increase in the number of loss firms. Existing theories on the valuation of loss firms are based on adaptation/abandonment options or limited liability, assuming that these firms are operationally distressed. In this paper, we show that many loss firms do not fit this stereotype and identify the primary value drivers of this new type of loss firms. Our analysis helps resolve the puzzling negative relation between earnings and market value documented in prior research. Overall, our findings underscore the importance of "hidden assets" or intangibles in the study of loss firms.

 

Asymmetric Timeliness Tests of Accounting Conservatism
J Richard Dietrich, Karl A. Muller and Edward Riedl

Recent accounting research employs an asymmetric timeliness measure to test the hypothesis that reported accounting earnings are “conservative.” This research design regresses earnings on stock returns to examine whether “bad” news is incorporated into earnings on a more timely basis than “good” news. We identify properties of the asymmetric timeliness estimation procedure that will result in biases in the test statistics except under very restrictive conditions that are rarely met in typical empirical settings. Using data series that are devoid of asymmetric timeliness in reported earnings, we show how these biases result in evidence consistent with conservatism. We conclude that the biased test statistics inherent in the asymmetric timeliness research design preclude using this method to measure conservatism; that these biases are irresolvable as they originate in the test’s specification; and that studies employing asymmetric timeliness tests cannot be interpreted as providing evidence of conservatism.

 

Demand for the Truth in Principal-Agent Relationships
Joshua Ronen and Varda Lewinstein Yaari

 

Consider the following puzzle: If earnings management is harmful to shareholders, why don't they design contracts that induce managers to reveal the truth? To answer this question, we model the shareholders-manager relationship as a principal-agent game in which the agent (the manager) alone observes the economic outcome. We show that the limited liability of the agent, defined as the agent's feasible minimum payment, might explain the demand for earnings management by the principal. Specifically, when the limited-liability level is high (low), a contract that induces earnings management may be less (more) costly than a truth-revealing contract. This finding offers a new explanation of the demand for earnings management.

 

Managerial Discretion and the Economic Determinants of the Disclosed Volatility Parameter for Valuing ESOs
Eli Bartov, Partha S. Mohanram and Doron Nissim

 

This study investigates the determinants of the expected stock-price volatility assumption that firms use in estimating ESO values and thus option expense. We find that, consistent with the guidance of FAS 123, firms use both historical and implied volatility in deriving the expected volatility parameter. We also find, however, that the importance of each of the two variables in explaining disclosed volatility relates inversely to their values, which results in a reduction in expected volatility and thus option value. This can be interpreted as managers opportunistically use the discretion in estimating expected volatility afforded by FAS 123. Consistent with this, we find that managerial incentives or ability to understate option value play a key role in this behavior. Since discretion in estimating expected volatility is common to both FAS 123 and 123(R), our analysis has important implications for market participants as well as regulators.

 



Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 11, Issue 4, December 2006


Do Firms Understate Stock Option-Based Compensation Expense

David Aboody, Mary E. Barth and Ron Kasznik

 

Governance Structure and the Weighting of Performance Measures

Fernando Penalva and Antonio Davila

Disclosure of Fees Paid to Auditors and the Market Valuation of Earnings Surprises
Jere Francis and Bin Ke

Organized Labor and Information Asymmetry in the Financial Markets
Gilles Hilary
 
SEC interventions and the frequency and usefulness of non-GAAP financial measures
Ana C. Marques

Trading Incentives to Meet Earnings Thresholds
Sarah E. McVay, Venky Nagar, Vicki Tang
 



Abstracts
Volume 11, Issue 4, December 2006


 

Do Firms Understate Stock Option-Based Compensation Expense

David Aboody, Mary E. Barth and Ron Kasznik

 

Focusing on the four key option pricing model inputs – expected option life, expected stock price volatility, expected dividend yield, and the risk-free interest rate for the expected life of the option – this study finds that firms understate option value estimates and, thus, stock-based compensation expense disclosed under SFAS 123. As predicted based on incentives and opportunities for management to understate SFAS 123 expense, the understatement of option value estimates is increasing in proxies for the magnitude of the expense, is greater for firms with weaker corporate governance, and, to a lesser extent, is increasing in the excessiveness of executive pay. The findings are strongest for the expected option life and expected stock price volatility input assumptions, consistent with firms’ greater latitude in determining these inputs. We find weaker evidence of understatement associated with the expected dividend yield assumption, and none for the interest rate assumption, consistent with these inputs being less amenable to discretion. Taken together, our findings raise some concern that the exercise of management discretion adversely affects the overall reliability of SFAS 123 expense.

 

Governance Structure and the Weighting of Performance Measures

Fernando Penalva and Antonio Davila

 

We empirically examine how governance structure affects the design of executive compensation contracts and in particular, the implicit weights of firm performance measures in CEO’s compensation. We find that compensation contracts in firms with higher takeover protection and where the CEO has more influence on governance decisions put more weight on accounting-based measures of performance (return on assets) compared to stock-based performance measures (market returns). In additional tests, we further find that CEO compensation in these firms has lower variance and a higher proportion of cash (versus stock-based) compensation. We further find that CEOs’ incentives (measured as changes in CEO annual wealth which includes expected changes in the value of the CEO’s equity holdings in addition to yearly compensation) do not vary across governance structures. These findings are consistent with CEOs in firms with high takeover protection and where they have more influence on governance negotiating different contracts.

 

Disclosure of Fees Paid to Auditors and the Market Valuation of Earnings Surprises
Jere Francis and Bin Ke


We investigate if the SEC’s recently mandated disclosure of fees for audit and nonaudit services paid by firms to their incumbent auditors affected the market’s perception of auditor independence and earnings quality. Following the initial fee disclosures in 2001, we find that the market valuation of quarterly earnings surprises (earnings response coefficient) was significantly lower for firms with high levels of nonaudit fees than for firms with low levels of such fees. In contrast, in the year prior to the new fee disclosures, there was no reduction in earnings response coefficients for firms that subsequently reported high nonaudit fees. Our evidence suggests that mandated fee disclosures provided new information that was viewed by the market as relevant to appraising auditor independence and earnings quality.

 

Organized Labor and Information Asymmetry in the Financial Markets
Gilles Hilary


Prior results from the labor relations literature suggest that revealing information weakens management’s position in collective bargaining. Thus, when facing organized labor, management has an incentive to preserve the information asymmetry with outsiders. This study uses a sample from a large cross-section of the economy over several years to test this relation. Results are consistent with this prediction. Strong organized labor is associated with higher bid-ask spreads, higher probability of informed trading, lower trading volume and lower analyst coverage. These relations hold after controlling for numerous factors such as growth opportunities or risk.

 

SEC interventions and the frequency and usefulness of non-GAAP financial measures
Ana C. Marques

 

This paper examines the effect of two SEC regulatory interventions related to disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures. There are three main results. First, the probability of disclosure of non-GAAP earnings declines in 2003, but the probability of disclosure of other non-GAAP financial measures has an accelerated decline after the first intervention. Second, all else equal, after Regulation G, investors have a positive market reaction to the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings. Finally, investors react to the adjustments made by I/B/E/S financial analysts as they do to the GAAP surprise, but they do not react to the additional adjustments made by firms.

 

Trading Incentives to Meet Earnings Thresholds
Sarah E. McVay, Venky Nagar, Vicki Tang

 

We examine stock sales as a managerial incentive to help explain the discontinuity around the analyst forecast benchmark. We find that the likelihood of just meeting versus just missing the analyst forecast is strongly associated with subsequent managerial stock sales. Moreover, we provide evidence that managers manage earnings prior to just meeting the threshold and selling their shares. Finally, the relation between just meeting and subsequently selling shares does not hold for non-manager insiders, who arguably cannot affect the earnings outcome, and is weaker in the presence of an independent board, suggesting that good corporate governance mitigates this strategic behavior.

 


Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 11, Issue 2/3, June/September 2006

This double issue publishes papers presented at a conference on Earnings Measurement & Performance Reporting at the Columbia Business School in October 2005.



Editorial

Stephen Penman

 

Over-investment of free cash flow

Scott Richardson

Discussion of “Over-investment of free cash flow”
Daniel Bergstresser

Which approach to accounting for employee stock options best reflects market pricing?
Wayne R. Landsman, Ken V. Peasnell, Peter F. Pope, Shu Yeh

Discussion of “Which approach to accounting for employee stock options best reflects market pricing?”
David Aboody

The persistence of earnings and cash flows and the role of special items: Implications for the accrual anomaly
Patricia M. Dechow and Weili Ge

Discussion of “The persistence of earnings and cash flows and the role of special items: Implications for the accrual anomaly”
Patricia M. Fairfield

Performance, Growth and Earnings Management
Chi-Wen Jevons Lee, Laura Yue Li, Heng Yue

Discussion of “Performance, Growth and Earnings Management”
Venky Nagar

Divisional performance measurement and transfer pricing for intangible assets
Nicole Bastian Johnson

Discussion of “Divisional performance measurement and transfer pricing for intangible assets”
Tim Baldenius

Feedback loops, fair value accounting and correlated investments
Robert J. Bloomfield, Mark W. Nelson, Steven D. Smith

Discussion of “Feedback loops, fair value accounting and correlated investments”
Lisa Koonce



Abstracts
Volume 11, Issue 2/3, June/September 2006

This double issue publishes papers presented at a conference on Earnings Measurement & Performance Reporting at the Columbia Business School in October 2005.


 

Over-investment of free cash flow

Scott Richardson

 

This paper examines the extent of firm level over-investment of free cash flow. Using an accounting-based framework to measure over-investment and free cash flow, I find evidence that, consistent with agency cost explanations, over-investment is concentrated in firms with the highest levels of free cash flow. Further tests examine whether firms’ governance structures are associated with over-investment of free cash flow. The evidence suggests that certain governance structures, such as the presence of activist shareholders, appear to mitigate over-investment.

 

Discussion of “Overinvestment of free cash flow”

Daniel Bergstresser

 

Richardson’s paper is a useful addition to the literature on the relationship between cash flow and investment. His approach to estimating this relationship is a new twist on earlier approaches. Like most of this literature, Richardson finds evidence that firms’ investment decisions are excessively sensitive to current cash flow, suggesting that violations of the Modigliani–Miller assumptions are empirically important. My view is that conceptual and implementation problems beset Richardson’s attempt to identify the specific violation of the Modigliani–Miller assumptions, and his evidence on this second point is not convincing.

 

Which approach to accounting for employee stock options best reflects market pricing?
Wayne R. Landsman, Ken V. Peasnell, Peter F. Pope, Shu Yeh

 

We use a residual income valuation framework to compare equity valuation implications of four approaches to employee stock options (ESOs) accounting: APB 25 “recognize nothing”, SFAS 123 (revised) “recognize ESO expense”, FASB Exposure Draft “recognize and expense ESO asset” and “recognize ESO asset and liability”. Theoretical analysis shows only grant date recognition of an asset and liability, and subsequent marking-to-market of the liability, results in accounting numbers that capture the dilution effects of ESOs on current shareholder value. Out-of-sample equity market value prediction tests and in-sample comparisons of model explanatory power also support the “recognize ESO asset and liability” method.

 

Discussion of “Which approach to accounting for employee stock options best reflects market pricing?”
David Aboody

The objective of the Landsman, Peasnel, Pope and Yeah paper (in this issue) is to compare, for current shareholders, the value relevance of four methods of accounting for employee stock options (ESOs). My discussion provides a unifying framework for the theoretical analyses and the link between the theoretical analyses and the empirical investigation.

 

The persistence of earnings and cash flows and the role of special items: Implications for the accrual anomaly
Patricia M. Dechow and Weili Ge

 

We argue that high accruals are likely to be the outcome of rules with an income statement perspective, while low accruals are likely to be the outcome of rules with a balance sheet perspective, and that this has implications for the properties of earnings. Specifically, earnings persistence is affected both by the magnitude and sign of the accruals. Accruals improve the persistence of earnings relative to cash flows in high accrual firms, but reduce earnings persistence in low accrual firms. We show that the low persistence of earnings in low accrual firms is primarily driven by special items. We then show that special item-low accrual firms have higher future stock returns than other low accrual firms. This is consistent with investors misunderstanding the transitory nature of special items. Further analysis reveals that special item-low accrual firms have poor past performance and declines in investor recognition (analyst coverage and institutional holdings). Special items continue to explain future returns after controlling for these factors.

 

Discussion of “The persistence of earnings and cash flows and the role of special items: Implications for the accrual anomaly”
Patricia Fairfield

 

Dechow and Ge (2006, Review of Accounting Studies, 11) add new descriptive evidence to the literature on earnings behavior and investor reaction to earnings. Specifically, they find that low accrual firms with negative special items have higher returns on assets and higher market returns in future years. Their paper raises interesting questions about conservative accounting and about the effect of special items on the future performance of distressed firms. However, because the authors position their paper as an investigation of the accruals anomaly they don’t explore many of the issues they raise, and so miss an opportunity to make a more substantive contribution to our understanding of the behavior of and reaction to accounting information.

 

Performance, Growth and Earnings Management
Chi-Wen Jevons Lee, Laura Yue Li, Heng Yue

 

We study the relationship between the amount of managed earnings and firms’ earnings performance and expected growth in a reporting model, where managers manipulate earnings to influence the valuation of firms’ equity while bearing a cost that is increasing and convex in the amount of managed earnings. In the unique revealing equilibrium to the model, firms with higher performance and growth over-report earnings by a larger amount because price responsiveness increases with earnings performance and growth. And earnings quality, defined as the proportion of true economic earnings in total reported earnings, increases with earnings performance but decreases with earnings growth. We conduct empirical tests on a large sample and a restatement sample using different proxies for earnings management. Results from the large sample tests support our predictions while results from the restatement sample tests are mixed. Our study provides an alternative explanation to the positive relationship between discretionary accruals estimated from the Jones model and firms’ performance and growth.

 

Discussion of “Performance, Growth and Earnings Management”
Venky Nagar

 

In an economy of firms with varying levels of performance, which firms are more likely to manage their earnings? The conference paper by Lee, Li, and Yue provides a promising approach to disentangle economic performance from earnings management in large-sample settings. The authors develop an analytical signaling model of earnings management in an economy and confront its equilibrium predictions with the data.

 

Divisional performance measurement and transfer pricing for intangible assets
Nicole Bastian Johnson

 

This paper examines the effectiveness of three transfer pricing methodologies for an intangible asset that is developed through bilateral, sequential investment. In general, a royalty-based transfer price that can be renegotiated provides better investment incentives than either a non-negotiable royalty-based transfer price or a purely negotiated transfer price, and in some cases induces first-best investment. This result contrasts with previous research that finds that the inability to limit renegotiation of initial contracts reduces investment efficiency. Further, I examine how tax transfer pricing rules inform optimal internal transfer prices when the firm decouples internal and external transfer prices.

 

Discussion of “Divisional performance measurement and transfer pricing for intangible assets”
Tim Baldenius

 

The conference paper by Johnson (2006, Review of Accounting Studies, forthcoming) develops an incomplete-contracting transfer pricing model with a number of novel features: taxation, sequential investments, and intangible assets being transferred. This discussion aims to disentangle these features so as to highlight those that are the key drivers of the results. Moreover, I show that some of the results can be generalized to settings involving a greater level of technological interdependency between the divisions.

 

Feedback loops, fair value accounting and correlated investments
Robert J. Bloomfield, Mark W. Nelson, Steven D. Smith

 

This paper presents and tests a model of the price dynamics that arise when investors fail to recognize the redundancy of unrealized gains and losses (“UGLs”) that are correlated with the firm’s past returns. Consistent with the predictions of our model, our experiment shows that a firm’s prices and earnings become highly volatile when correlated investment is large and correlated UGLs are made salient by comprehensive income reporting. The results suggest that including correlated UGLs in performance numbers could induce violations of weak-form efficiency that exacerbate volatility in share prices and earnings.

 

Discussion of “Feedback loops, fair value accounting and correlated investments”
Lisa Koonce

 

My paper discusses Bloomfield, Nelson, and Smith’s (BNS) model and experimental study of the price dynamics that arise when a firm’s accounting reports are predictable from its stock returns. This phenomenon occurs when the firm takes a position in an asset that generates unrealized gains and losses (UGL’s) that are correlated with the firm’s own returns. My discussion of BNS focuses on three features that are often used to evaluate research—namely, potential for falsification, internal validity, and external validity. I view and evaluate the BNS paper in light of each of these features. I also briefly comment on how well the paper addresses issues related to fair value accounting.

 


Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 11, Issue 1, March 2006



Stock Price Reaction to Evidence of Earnings Management Implications for Supplementary Financial Disclosure

William R. Baber, Shuping Chen and Sok-Hyon Kang

 

A Political—Economic Analysis of Auditor Reporting and Auditor Switches

K. Hung Chan, Kenny Z. Lin and Phyllis Lai-lan Mo

Stock Market Anomalies: What can we Learn from Repurchases and Insider Trading?
John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay, Scott A. Richardson and Rodrigo S. Verdi

Do Short Sellers Target Firms with Poor Earnings Quality? Evidence from Earnings Restatements
Hemang Desai, Srinivasan Krishnamurthy and Kumar Venkataraman
 
The Effect of SFAS No. 131 on the Cross-Segment Variability of Profits Reported by Multiple Segment Firms
Michael L. Ettredge, Soo Young Kwon, David B. Smith and Mary S. Stone

Venture-Backed Private Equity Valuation and Financial Statement Information
Chris Armstrong, Antonio Davila and George Foster
 



Abstracts
Volume 11, Issue 1, March 2006


 

Stock Price Reaction to Evidence of Earnings Management Implications for Supplementary Financial Disclosure

William R. Baber, Shuping Chen and Sok-Hyon Kang

 

We condition security price reactions to quarterly earnings announcements on whether firms disclose supplementary balance sheet and/or cashflow information that can be used to estimate the consequences of earnings management. Disclosure of supplementary information is voluntary, and thus, we consider the possibility that firms that disclose balance sheet and/or cashflow information differ systematically from firms that do not disclose. Results indicate that investors discount evidence of earnings management at the disclosure date when supplementary information is disclosed. Such results indicate more informed earnings interpretations of quarterly earnings when firms provide balance sheet and/or cashflow information concurrently.

 

A Political—Economic Analysis of Auditor Reporting and Auditor Switches

K. Hung Chan, Kenny Z. Lin and Phyllis Lai-lan Mo

 

This study examines whether auditor opinions are affected by political and economic influences from governments. We use auditor locality (local versus non-local) to capture such influences from local governments in China. Based on data from China’s stock markets for the period 1996–2002, we find that local auditors, who have greater economic dependence on local clients and are subject to more political influence from local governments than non-local auditors, are inclined to report favorably on local government-owned companies to mitigate probable economic losses. Moreover, companies with

qualified opinions are more likely to switch from a non-local auditor to a local auditor than companies with unqualified opinions. Contrary to some prior studies, we find that in China’s political environment, local government-owned companies that switched from a non-local auditor to a local auditor after receiving a qualified opinion can succeed in opinion shopping.

 

Stock Market Anomalies: What can we Learn from Repurchases and Insider Trading?
John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay, Scott A. Richardson and Rodrigo S. Verdi

 

We examine whether managers’ trading decisions (both at a firm and personal level) are correlated with trading strategies suggested by the operating accruals and the post-earnings announcement drift (SUE) anomalies. We discuss advantages and disadvantages of the use of managerial trading activity to infer managers’ private valuation about their own securities. Our results provide corroborative evidence for the accruals anomaly, i.e., managers’ repurchase and insider trading behavior varies consistently with the information underlying the operating accruals trading strategy. On the other hand, we do not find corroborative evidence for the SUE anomaly.

 

Do Short Sellers Target Firms with Poor Earnings Quality? Evidence from Earnings Restatements
Hemang Desai, Srinivasan Krishnamurthy and Kumar Venkataraman

 

We study the behavior of short sellers around earnings restatements. We find that short sellers accumulate positions in restating firms several months in advance of the restatement and subsequently unwind these positions after the drop in share price induced by the restatement. The increase in short interest is larger for firms with high levels of accruals prior to restatement. We document that heavily shorted firms experience poor subsequent performance and a higher ‘rate of delisting. Overall, these results suggest that the motive for short selling is, at least in part, related to suspect financial reporting and that short sellers pay attention to information being conveyed by accruals.

 

The Effect of SFAS No. 131 on the Cross-Segment Variability of Profits Reported by Multiple Segment Firms
Michael L. Ettredge, Soo Young Kwon, David B. Smith and Mary S. Stone

 

Our study assesses whether SFAS No. 131 improved disclosure about the diversity of multiple segment firms’ operations. We find a post-SFAS No. 131 increase in cross-segment variability of segment profits, an increase in the association between reported and inherent cross-segment variability, and an increase in association between reported variability and capital market incentives to disclose. We interpret the results as evidence that SFAS No. 131 increased the transparency of segment profitability disclosures, and as indicating SFAS No. 131 allowed firms depending more on external financing to disclose more about differences in segment profitability.

 

Venture-Backed Private Equity Valuation and Financial Statement Information
Chris Armstrong, Antonio Davila and George Foster

 

The relationship between (a) private and public equity market valuations and (b) financial statement information is examined for a sample of 502 venture capital backed companies from six different industries over the 1993–2003 period. Financial statement information explains a sizable component of the levels of and changes in valuation in both the Pre-IPO and Post-IPO periods. The findings support prior research for Post-IPO companies that revenues are value enhancing and costs are value diminishing. For the Pre-IPO period, we find that cost of sales; sales, marketing, general and administrative; and research and development are value enhancing—even when revenues are included in the analysis. This is consistent with costs incurred by early-stage, venture-backed companies having a strong ‘‘investment aspect’’ as the companies build a platform/infrastructure to grow revenue and validate their business model(s). We document the growth of early stage companies for revenues and costs in both calendar time (by round of private equity financing) and event time (relative to their eventual IPO).

 

 



Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 10, Issue 4, December 2005



Earnings Components, Accounting Bias and Equity Valuation

Peter F. Pope & Pengguo Wang

 

An Empirical Test of the Feltham-Ohlson (1995) Model

Jeffery Callen & Dan Segal

Bonuses and Non-Public Information in Publicly Traded Firms
Rachel Hayes & Scott Schaefer

Abnormal Returns from Predicting Earnings Thresholds
Lynn Rees
 
Market Reaction to Multiple Contemporaneous Earnings Signals:  Earnings Announcements and Future Earnings Guidance
Rowland Atiase, Haidan Li, Somchai Supattarakul & Senyo Tse

Perspectives

Accrual Accounting for Performance Evaluation
Sunil Dutta & Stefan Reichelstein
 



Abstracts
Volume 10, Issue 4, December 2005


 

Earnings Components, Accounting Bias and Equity Valuation

Peter F. Pope & Pengguo Wang

 

In this paper we address three issues in accounting-based equity valuation: (i) How are valuation parameters related to earnings persistence and accounting conservatism when earnings components aggregate, or “add up”, in valuation? (ii) What does aggregation of earnings components in valuation imply for abnormal earnings dynamics? and (iii) When is an earnings component “irrelevant” and “core” earnings the relevant construct for valuation? Assuming linear valuation, no-arbitrage, dividend irrelevance and clean surplus accounting, we show that when earnings components aggregate, valuation expressions and abnormal earnings dynamics are generalizations of the Ohlson (1995) model, incorporating simple adjustments for accounting conservatism. When “core” earnings is the relevant earnings construct, valuation expressions closely resemble the aggregation case, but core (abnormal) earnings replaces clean surplus (abnormal) earnings. We demonstrate that an earnings component can be irrelevant in valuation even when it is predictable.

 

An Empirical Test of the Feltham-Ohlson (1995) Model

Jeffery Callen & Dan Segal

 

This paper tests the Feltham-Ohlson (1995) model by transforming the undefined “other information” variables into expectational variables, as suggested by Liu and Ohlson (2000). The signs of the estimated coefficients conform to the model’s predictions using panel data techniques, non-parametric estimation, reverse regressions and portfolio regressions. The tests reject the Ohlson model in favor of Feltham-Ohlson. Nevertheless, the estimated leverage coefficient takes a value of three instead of one for most variations of the model. Also, the one-year-ahead price predictions of the Feltham-Ohlson model are no more accurate than those of the Ohlson model or a naive earnings valuation model.

 

Bonuses and Non-Public Information in Publicly Traded Firms
Rachel Hayes & Scott Schaefer

 

Recent research in accounting explores how firms use \individual" or \non-financial" measures of performance in executive compensation contracts. We model a
firm that conditions bonus payments to executives on information that is not available to those outside the firm. This raises two issues. First, market participants may use the magnitude of such payments to infer the non-public information. Second, because information that is non-public is, by extension, non-verifiable, the firm cannot write explicit contracts based on it. Combining the relational incentive contracts and financial signaling literatures, we examine equilibria of a signaling game in which bonus payments from a firm to a manager convey non-public information regarding the firm's future cash flows. Our main result is that increases in corporate myopia can, under some conditions, lead to increased profits. This finding is contrary to that typically found in financial signaling models.

 

Abnormal Returns from Predicting Earnings Thresholds
Lynn Rees

 

This paper examines the performance of a trading strategy based on the prediction of firms concurrently reporting a positive earnings change and meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts.  The study extends prior research that examines excess returns based only on earnings changes (e.g., Ou and Penman, 1989; Penman and Zhang, 2002a).  The evidence indicates that a model predicting forecast errors concurrently with earnings changes can yield excess returns that are incremental to predicting only one earnings threshold.  Moreover, I find that the prediction of forecast errors is relatively more important than predicting earnings changes.  The incremental benefit from predicting earnings changes concurrently with forecast errors is small relative to a model that predicts only forecast errors.  The results hold after controlling for various risk factors and known anomalies.

 

Market Reaction to Multiple Contemporaneous Earnings Signals:  Earnings Announcements and Future Earnings Guidance
Rowland Atiase, Haidan Li, Somchai Supattarakul & Senyo Tse

 

We examine market reactions to contemporaneous announcements of current earnings and future earnings guidance for evidence on how investors trade off relevance and reliability.  Current earnings are more reliable than future earnings guidance, but future earnings guidance may be more relevant for predicting future performance.  We find that current earnings are more strongly associated with announcement-period returns than concurrently-disclosed future earnings guidance, consistent with investors’ relative preference for reliability.  We find similar return reactions to stand-alone earnings and to earnings released with guidance.  In contrast, return reactions are lower for guidance announced simultaneously with current earnings than for stand-alone guidance.

 

Perspectives

Accrual Accounting for Performance Evaluation
Sunil Dutta & Stefan Reichelstein

 

This paper examines alternative accrual accounting rules from an incentive and control perspective. For a range of common production, financing and investment decisions we consider alternative asset valuation rules. The criterion for distinguishing among these rules is that the corresponding performance measure should provide managers with robust incentives to make present value maximizing decisions. Such goal congruence is shown to require intertemporal matching of revenues and expenses, though the specific form of matching needed for control purposes generally differs from GAAP. The practitioner oriented literature on economic profit plans has made various, and at times conflicting, recommendations regarding adjustments to the accounting rules used for external financial reporting. Our goal congruence approach provides a framework for comparing and evaluating these recommendations.

 

 


Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 10, Issue 2/3, June/September 2005

 

Special Double Issue on Financial Statement Analysis and Valuation:

This double issue publishes papers presented at a conference on Financial Statement Analysis and Valuation at the Mendoza College of Business, University of Notre Dame in September 2004.



Editorial

Stephen Penman

 

Separating Winners from Losers among Low Book-to-Market Stocks using Financial Statement Analysis

Partha Mohanram

Discussion of "Separating Winners from Losers among Low Book-to-Market Stocks using Financial Statement Analysis"
Joe Piotroski

Information Uncertainty and Expected Returns
Guohua Jiang, Charles Lee, and Grace Zhang
 
Discussion of “Information Uncertainty and Expected Returns”
Paul Schultz

Conservatism, Growth and the Role of Accounting Numbers in the Fundamental Analysis Process
Steve Monahan
 
Discussion of “Conservatism, Growth and the Role of Accounting Numbers in the Fundamental Analysis Process”
Xiao-Jun Zhang

Conditional and Unconditional Conservatism: Concepts and Modeling
Bill Beaver and Stephen Ryan
 
Discussion of “Conditional and Unconditional Conservatism: Concepts and Modeling”
Sudipta Basu

On Accounting-based Valuation Formulae
James Ohlson
 
Expected EPS and EPS Growth as Determinants of Value
James Ohlson and Beate Juettner-Nauroth

Discussion of “On Accounting-based Valuation Formulae” and “Expected EPS and EPS Growth as Determinants of Value”
Stephen Penman




Abstracts
Volume 10, Issue 2/3, June/September 2005


 

Editorial

Stephen Penman

 

This double issue publishes papers presented at a conference on Financial Statement Analysis and Valuation at the Mendoza College of Business, University of Notre Dame in September 2004.  Review of Accounting Studies editor, Peter Easton organized this conference.  His fellow editors thank him, his staff and his colleagues for their kind hospitality.  We also thank the Mendoza College of Business for financial assistance.  Our thanks go also to the paper discussants who brought critical insight.  Their discussions are published alongside the papers in this issue. 

 

Barclays Global Investors sponsored a cash prize for the best paper at the conference, as they have generously done at previous conferences.  This year, the best paper (selected by secret ballot from conference attendees) was shared.  The winners were: “Conservatism, Growth and the Role of Accounting Numbers in the Fundamental Analysis Process” by Steve Monahan; “Conditional and Unconditional Conservatism: Concepts and Modeling” by Bill Beaver and Stephen Ryan; “On Accounting-based Valuation Formulae” by James Ohlson; and “Expected EPS and EPS Growth as Determinants of Value” by James Ohlson and Beate Juettner-Nauroth.  The Morgan Stanley prize for the best discussion was awarded to Joseph Piotroski for his commentary, published in this issue, on “Separating Winners from Losers among Low Book-to-Market Stocks using Financial Statement Analysis” by Partha Mohanram.  Congratulations to these winners, and thanks to the sponsors for the awards: Barclays Global Investors and Morgan Stanley.

 

Separating Winners from Losers among Low Book-to-Market Stocks using Financial Statement Analysis

Partha Mohanram

 

This paper tests whether a strategy based on financial statement analysis of low book-to-market (growth) stocks is successful in differentiating between winners and losers in terms of future stock performance. Piotroski (2000) finds that traditional fundamental analysis is effective in a sample of high BM (value) stocks. This paper tailors fundamental analysis for the specific context of low BM (growth) stocks. I create an index (GSCORE) based on a combination of traditional fundamentals such as earnings and cash flows and measures appropriate for growth firms such as the stability of earnings and growth and the intensity of R&D, capital expenditure and advertising. A strategy based on buying high GSCORE firms and shorting low GSCORE firms consistently earns significant excess returns, though most of the returns are on the short side. The results are robust to a variety of partitions based on size, analyst following and liquidity and persist after controlling for well documented risk and anomaly factors such as momentum, book-to-market, accruals and size. The stock market in general and analysts in particular are much more likely to be positively surprised by firms whose growth oriented fundamentals are strong, indicating that the stock market fails to grasp the future implications of current fundamentals. Further, the results do not support a risk based explanation for the book-to-market effect as the strategy returns positive returns in all years, and firms with lower systematic, unsystematic and ex-ante risk have better future returns. Finally, tests indicate support for a contextual approach to fundamental analysis with traditional fundamental analysis working best for high BM (value) stocks and the modified fundamental analysis developed in this paper working best for low BM (growth) stocks.

 

Discussion of "Separating Winners from Losers among Low Book-to-Market Stocks using Financial Statement Analysis"
Joe Piotroski

 

The conference paper by Mohanram (2005) provides evidence on the success of contextual financial statement analysis in the low book-to-market (i.e., glamour) stock setting. The economic benefits of the strategy are concentrated in the identification of glamour firms that will ultimately underperform the market. However, in contrast to traditional accounting-based anomalies, the returns to Mohanram’s growth-based trading strategy are stronger among large, heavily followed firms, suggesting that the mechanisms behind the mispricing of glamour firms are different than the traditional information environment and dissemination arguments found in other settings. Despite the robustness of the reported results, the strategy may face implementation constraints due to (1) the relative costs associated with gathering industry-adjusted data and (2) the frictions and costs associated with capitalizing on expected price declines over a long horizon. Finally, the relative benefits of contextual analysis need to be assessed against the predictive benefits accruing to traditional financial statement analysis-based investment techniques.

 

Information Uncertainty and Expected Returns
Guohua Jiang, Charles Lee, and Grace Zhang

 

This study examines the role of information uncertainty (IU) in predicting cross-sectional stock returns.  We define IU in terms of “value ambiguity,” or the precision with which firm value can be estimated by knowledgeable investors at reasonable cost.  Using several different proxies for IU, we show that: (1) On average, High-IU firms earn lower future returns (the “mean” effect), and (2) Price and earnings momentum effects are much stronger among high-IU firms (the “interaction” effect).  These findings are consistent with analytical models in which high IU exacerbates investor overconfidence and limits rational arbitrage.

 

Discussion of “Information Uncertainty and Expected Returns”
Paul Schultz

 

Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005, this issue) show that stock returns are smaller for young firms, volatile stocks, high volume stocks, and stocks with long equity durations. In addition to having lower returns, momentum effects are particularly strong in these stocks. The focus of this discussion is on the informal behavioral model that is used to explain these results and the how well the variables used in the study proxy for information uncertainty, the model=s focus.

 

Conservatism, Growth and the Role of Accounting Numbers in the Fundamental Analysis Process
Steve Monahan

 

In this study I evaluate the effects of conservative accounting for research and development (R&D) and past growth in R&D on two phenomena that are pertinent to the fundamental analysis process: (1) the relation between aggregate earnings (deflated by price) and contemporaneous stock return, and (2) the association between estimates of value derived from the residual income valuation model (i.e., RIV estimates) and equity market value.  I show that the conservative treatment of R&D affects the earnings/return relation only for firms that experience high growth in R&D during the return interval of interest.  I also demonstrate that the effect of conservative accounting for R&D on the association between RIV estimates and equity market values is increasing in past growth in R&D.

 

Discussion of “Conservatism, Growth and the Role of Accounting Numbers in the Fundamental Analysis Process”
Xiao-Jun Zhang

 

This paper discusses Professor Monahan’s empirical study of how conservative accounting of R&D affects the relations (i) between earnings and stock return; (ii) between estimates of value using the residual income valuation model and equity market value. My discussion focuses on the underlying mechanism of why growth matters and how the growth rate should be measured. In particular, I argue that different aspects of growth (e.g., short-term growth versus long-term growth) matter under different circumstances, depending on the intended use of accounting data. Failure to adjust for these differences affects the effectiveness of the empirical tests. The discussion also considers the impacts of potential noise in the R&D capitalization procedure and the presence of other intangible assets.


Conditional and Unconditional Conservatism: Concepts and Modeling
Bill Beaver and Stephen Ryan

 

We develop a general model that captures the distinct natures of two general types of accounting conservatism: (1) unconditional conservatism, meaning that aspects of the accounting process determined at the inception of assets or liabilities tend to yield understatement of the book value of net assets relative to their market value (i.e., unrecorded goodwill), and (2) conditional conservatism, meaning that the book value of net assets is written down under sufficiently adverse circumstances but not written up under favorable circumstances. The model captures how the two types of conservatism interact, most notably, how unconditional conservatism yields unrecorded goodwill that preempts the application of conditional conservatism unless news is sufficiently bad to use up that goodwill. The model yields a specification of earnings that we analyze conceptually and using simulations to develop hypotheses about how unconditional conservatism affects the asymmetric response of earnings to positive and negative share returns, both current and lagged, documented by Basu (1995, 1997) and the subsequent literature on conditional conservatism.

 

Discussion of “Conditional and Unconditional Conservatism: Concepts and Modeling”
Sudipta Basu

 

Beaver & Ryan (2004) algebraically model, simulate and graph the effects of various factors on the non-linear earnings-return relation induced by conditional conservatism.  Their analysis clarifies how conditional and unconditional conservatism are inter-related.  I discuss why unconditional and conditional conservatism are more than mere substitutes, and provide evidence from the historical record.  I highlight a few areas for future modeling before moving on to discuss potential empirical tests of their predicted relations.  I identify some research questions and opportunities for future investigation.


On Accounting-based Valuation Formulae
James Ohlson

 

This paper considers accounting-based valuation formulae.  Its initial focus is on two problems related to residual income valuation (RIV).  First, insofar valuation depends on the present value of expected dividends per share, applying RIV requires clean surplus accounting on a per share basis.  Awkwardly, equity transactions that change the number of shares outstanding generally imply. A clean surplus equality holds only if one “re-conceptualizes” either end-of-period bvps or eps as a forced “plug”. Second, one cannot circumvent the per share issue by evaluating RIV on a total dollar value basis unless one introduces relatively subtle MM-type restrictions.  In light of RIV’s unsatisfactory aspects, the paper proposes an alternative to RIV.  This new approach maintains a strict eps-focus. It derives by replacing bvpst in RIV with  capitalized (i.e. divided by r). One obtains a formula such that the current market price equals next-period expected earnings capitalized plus the present value of expected abnormal earnings growth, referred to as AEG. A number of propositions then demonstrate the advantages of the AEG approach as compared to RIV.  These results follow because  capitalized generally approximates market price better than .

 

Expected EPS and EPS Growth as Determinants of Value
James Ohlson and Beate Juettner-Nauroth

 

This paper develops a parsimonious model relating a firm’s price per share to, (i), next year expected earnings per share (or 12 months forward eps), (ii), short term growth (FY-2 vs. FY.1) in eps, (iii), long-term (asymptotic) growth in eps, and, (iv), cost-of-equity capital. The model assumes that the present value of dividends per share (dps) determines price, but it does not restrict how the dps-sequence is expected to evolve. All of these aspects of the model contrast sharply with the standard (Gordon/Williams) text-book approach, which equates the growth rates of expected dps and eps and fixes the growth rate and the payout rate. Though the constant growth model arises as a peculiar special case, the analysis in this paper rests on more general principles, including dividend policy irrelevancy.  A second key result inverts the valuation formula to show how one expresses cost-of-capital as a function of the forward eps to price ratio and the two measures of growth in expected eps.  This expression generalizes the text-book equation in which cost-of-capital equals the dps-yield plus the growth in expected eps.

 

Discussion of “On Accounting-based Valuation Formulae” and “Expected EPS and EPS Growth as Determinants of Value”
Stephen Penman

 

This discussion evaluates the abnormal earnings growth valuation model (AEG) of Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth and, in similar vein to the Ohlson review paper at this conference, compares the model to the residual income valuation model (RIV) that has been the centerpiece of accounting-based valuation in recent years. The discussion begins with a statement of what one looks for in a practical valuation model. The innovations of the AEG model, well stated by Ohlson, are acknowledged. A comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative approaches provides some qualification, however, and draws out the utility of a residual income valuation approach.


Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 10, Issue 1, March 2005



The Role of Analysts’ Forecasts in Accounting-Based Valuation: A Critical Evaluation

Qiang Cheng

Sustained Earnings and Revenue Growth, Earnings Quality, and Earnings Response Coefficients
Aloke Ghosh, Zhaoyang Gu and Prem C. Jain

Auditor Size, Market Segmentation and Litigation Patterns: A Theoretical Analysis
Sasson Bar-Yosef and Bharat Sarath
 
Have Financial Statements Become Less Informative? Evidence from the Ability of Financial Ratios to Predict Bankruptcy
William H. Beaver, Maureen F. McNichols and Jung-Wu Rhie





Abstracts
Volume 10, Issue 1, March 2005


 

The Role of Analysts’ Forecasts in Accounting-Based Valuation: A Critical Evaluation

Qiang Cheng

 

This paper critically evaluates the use of analysts’ forecasts in accounting-based valuation. Specifically, I assess the usefulness and the limitation of analysts’ forecasts in predicting future earnings and in explaining the market-to-book ratio, in light of a comprehensive set of 22 explicit information items, including: economic rent proxies, conservative accounting proxies, earnings quality signals, transitory earnings proxies, industry characteristics, and risk and growth proxies. While analysts’ forecasts capture 45–83% of the information from these sources depending on model specifications, they do not appear to fully incorporate certain information items. In particular, proxies for conservative accounting and transitory earnings are incrementally useful in predicting future earnings; proxies for economic rents, conservative accounting, and risk are incrementally useful in explaining the market-to-book ratio. Collectively, these results validate the use of analysts’ forecasts as a parsimonious proxy for forward-looking information in accounting-based valuation and suggest how to improve on their use.

 

Sustained Earnings and Revenue Growth, Earnings Quality, and Earnings Response Coefficients
Aloke Ghosh, Zhaoyang Gu and Prem C. Jain

 

We show that firms reporting sustained increases in both earnings and revenues have (1) higher quality earnings and (2) larger earnings response coefficients (ERCs) in comparison to firms reporting sustained increases in earnings alone. With respect to earnings quality, firms with revenue-supported increases in earnings have more persistent earnings, exhibit less susceptibility to earnings management, and have higher future operating performance. With respect to response coefficients, firms with revenue-supported increases in earnings have both higher ERCs and lower book value response coefficients, consistent with the implications of the Ohlson (1995, Contemporary Accounting Research 12, 661–687) model.

 

Auditor Size, Market Segmentation and Litigation Patterns: A Theoretical Analysis
Sasson Bar-Yosef and Bharat Sarath

 

We provide a theoretical rationale for the observed audit industry structure where well-capitalized auditors hold an extremely large market share. Our analysis focuses on the economics of trading in an adverse selection market where audit quality is unobservable. We show that concentration of market share can arise even if well-capitalized auditors have no relative advantage with regard to supplying high-quality audits, and that the strategy of attracting a narrow base of high-margin clients is typically unsustainable in rational expectations equilibrium. Other results derived from our analysis of strategic competition for clients also conform (qualitatively) with empirical findings regarding audit fee structures and litigation rates. In particular, we show that better-capitalized auditors get a dominant market share, produce more accurate reports and are more profitable. In addition, we show that the imposition of high minimum standards increases the market power of wealthy auditors, even though smaller auditors can potentially provide the same level of audit quality at lower fees. All these results are demonstrated within a framework that endogenizes both a securities trading market and profit-maximizing auditors who strategically compete for clients.

 

Have Financial Statements Become Less Informative? Evidence from the Ability of Financial Ratios to Predict Bankruptcy
William H. Beaver, Maureen F. McNichols and Jung-Wu Rhie

 

Using a hazard model, we examine secular changes in the ability of financial statement data to predict bankruptcy from 1962 to 2002. We identify three trends in financial reporting that could influence predictive ability with respect to bankruptcy: FASB standards, the perceived increase in discretionary financial reporting behavior, and the increase in unrecognized assets and obligations. A parsimonious three-variable model provides significant explanatory power throughout the time period, with only a slight deterioration in predictive power from the first to the second time period. The striking feature of the results is the robustness of the predictive models over a forty-year period.

 


Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 9, Issue 4, December 2004



Residual Income Valuation:  Are Inflation Adjustments Necessary?

John O'Hanlon and Ken Peasnell

The Disciplining Role of Accounting in the Long Run
Anil Arya, Jonathan Glover, Brian Mittendorf, and Li Zhang

Accounting-Based Valuation with Changing Interest Rates
Dan Gode and James Ohlson
 
The Relevance of Non-financial Performance Measures for CEO Compensation: Evidence from the Airline Industry
Antonio Davila and Mohan Venkatachalam

Going-Public and the Influence of Disclosure Environments
Teye Marra and Jeroen Suijs

Accounting Conservatism and the Relation Between Returns and Accounting Data
Peter Easton and Jinhan Pae



Abstracts
Volume 9, Issue 4, December 2004


 

Residual Income Valuation:  Are Inflation Adjustments Necessary?

John O'Hanlon and Ken Peasnell

 

This paper explores the question of whether the residual income valuation relationship (RIVR) should be written in inflation-adjusted terms. This question is of particular interest in the light of Ritter and Warr's (2002) claim that the standard nominal historical cost formulation of RIVR misvalues firms because it fails to deal properly with inflation. We present two inflation-adjusted formulations of RIVR, each of which is based on an income measure from the inflation accounting literature, and one of which is a general case of a formulation proposed by Ritter and Warr. We show that neither of these formulations is any more or less correct than the standard formulation of RIVR, and find no support for the view that it is necessary to write RIVR in inflation-adjusted terms. Finally we argue that, in a setting in which accounting numbers and forecasts thereof are normally presented in historical cost terms, the inflation adjustment of RIVR is likely to bring unnecessary complication to the valuation process, with increased scope for error.

 

The Disciplining Role of Accounting in the Long Run
Anil Arya, Jonathan Glover, Brian Mittendorf, and Li Zhang

 

One role of accounting is to discipline softer (more manipulable) sources of information. We use a principal-agent model of hidden actions and hidden information to study this role. In our model, there is both a verifiable signal (a publicly observed output) and an unverifiable signal (a productivity parameter privately observed by the agent). In a one-period setting, the optimal contract does not make use of the agent’s report on the private signal. However, when the output is tracked over two periods, the agent’s communication can be valuable. This reversal of results suggests uncovering the disciplining role of accounting may require a long-term perspective

 

Accounting-Based Valuation with Changing Interest Rates
Dan Gode and James Ohlson

 

This paper generalizes Ohlson’s [Contemporary Accounting Research Vol. 11 No. 2. 661–687 (1995)] equity valuation framework to allow for stochastic interest rates. Much of this analysis initially deals with the specialized setting in which earnings suffice for cum-dividend value. In such a case, the beginning-of-period (lagged) rate determines the capitalization factor, not the current rate. The underlying earnings dynamic modifies the traditional random walk model via an additional term, namely current earnings multiplied by the percentage change in interest rates. The general model retains these basic aspects of the earnings-sufficiency setting. Empirical implications bear on the returns-to-earnings regression: The earnings-response coefficient decreases as the beginning-of-period rate increases

 

The Relevance of Non-financial Performance Measures for CEO Compensation: Evidence from the Airline Industry
Antonio Davila and Mohan Venkatachalam

 

This paper investigates the role of non-financial performance measures in executive compensation.  Using a sample of airline firms we document that passenger load factor, an important non-financial measure for firms in this industry, is positively associated with CEO cash compensation.  This association is significant after controlling for traditional accounting performance measures (return on assets) and financial performance measures (stock returns).  This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that non-financial measures provide incremental information about CEOs’ actions over financial measures and hence, receive a positive weight in compensation contracts.  We also explore cross-sectional differences in the importance of non-financial performance measures.  We find weak evidence that CEO power and the noise of financial performance measures impact the relationship between non-financial performance measures and cash compensation.

 

Going-Public and the Influence of Disclosure Environments
Teye Marra and Jeroen Suijs

 

This paper analyzes how differences in disclosure environments affect the firm’s choice between private and public capital. Disclosure requirements prescribe to what extent the firm has to release private information that may lead to the firm incurring proprietary costs. We examine which firm types go public in equilibrium, and how the equilibrium outcomes change with changes in the disclosure environments. Our findings show that in a partial financing equilibrium, should such an equilibrium exist, good firms finance privately. This result is robust to changes in the disclosure environment.

 

Accounting Conservatism and the Relation Between Returns and Accounting Data
Peter Easton and Jinhan Pae

 

This study adds change in cash investments and change in lagged operating assets to the regression of returns on earnings levels and earnings changes examined in Easton and Harris (1991).  We argue that a positive coefficient on change in cash investments captures conservatism associated with investments in positive net present value projects the effects of which will not flow into the accounting statements until the expected future benefits are realized. A positive coefficient on change in lagged operating assets implies accounting conservatism associated with the application of accounting rules to operating assets in place.  Our empirical results are, in general, consistent with these arguments.  We examine differences in conservatism across samples with different market to book ratios, we compare firms with non-negative returns with firms with negative returns, we compare firms reporting losses with firms reporting profits, and we examine firms in different industries, firms with different levels of research and development expenditure, different amounts of depreciation, different amounts of advertising expense, and firms that adopt LIFO inventory valuation compared with those that adopt an alternative to LIFO.


Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 9, Issues 2 and 3, June/September 2004



Editorial

Stephen Penman


The Role of Expectations Explaining the Cross-Section of Stock Returns
Tom Copeland, Aaron Dolgoff, Alberto Moel

Discussion of “The Role of Expectations Explaining the Cross-Section of Stock Returns”
Jing Liu

Implied Equity Duration:  A New Measure of Equity Risk
Patricia Dechow, Richard Sloan, Mark Soliman

Discussion of “Implied Equity Duration:  A New Measure of Equity Risk”
Pedro Santa-Clara

The Role of Information Precision in Determining the Cost of Equity Capital
Christine A.  Botosan, Marlene A.  Plumlee, Yuan  Xie

 

Discussion of “The Role of Information Precision in Determining the Cost of Equity Capital”
Michael Williams


How Banks' Value-at-Risk Disclosures Predict Their Total and Priced Risk:  Effects of Bank Technical Sophistication and Learning over Time
Bin Ke


Forward Versus Trailing Earnings in Equity Valuation
Kenton K. Yee


Discussion of “Forward Versus Trailing Earnings in Equity Valuation”
Peter Easton


The Effect of Accounting Restatements on Earnings Revisions and the Estimated Cost of Capital
Paul Hribar, Nicole Thorne Jenkins


Discussion of “The Effect of Accounting Restatements on Earnings Revisions and the Estimated Cost of Capital”
Ron Kasznik



 


Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 9, Issue 1, March 2004




Assessing the Probability of Bankruptcy
Stephen A. Hillegeist, Elizabeth K. Keating, Donald P. Cram, Kyle G. Lundstedt

Audit Firm Industry Specialization and Client Disclosure Quality
Kimberly A. Dunn, Brian W. Mayhew

Analyst Earnings Forecast Revisions and the Pricing of Accruals
Mary E. Barth, Amy P. Hutton

Inter-Departmental Cost Allocation and Investment Incentives
Donna Wei

The Profitability and Pricing of Major Customers
Marty Gosman, Trish Kelly, Per Olsson, Terry Warfield


 


Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 8, Issue 4, December 2003




Inferring the Cost of Capital Using the Ohlson-Juettner Model
Dan Gode, Partha Mohanram

Got Information? Investor Response to Form 10-K and Form 10-Q EDGAR Filings
Paul A. Griffin

Does the Stock Market Fully Appreciate the Implications of Leading Indicators for Future Earnings? Evidence from Order Backlog
Shivaram Rajgopal, Terry Shevlin, Mohan Venkatachalam

Accounting Returns Revisited: Evidence of their Usefulness in Estimating Economic Returns
Morris G. Danielson, Eric Press

Financial Statement Analysis of Leverage and How it Informs About Profitability and Price-to-Book Ratios
Doron Nissim, Stephen Penman

Comparing the Value Relevance of Two Operating Income Measures
Lawrence D. Brown, Kumar Sivakumar


 


Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 8, Issues 2 and 3, 2003


Editorial

The Predictive Value of Expenses Excluded from Pro Forma Earnings
Jeffrey T. Doyle, Russell J. Lundholm, Mark T. Soliman

Discussion of “The Predictive Value of Expenses Excluded from Pro Forma Earnings”
Peter Easton

Differential Market Reactions to Revenue and Expense Surprises
Yonca Ertimur, Joshua Livnat, Minna Martikainen

Discussion of “Differential Market Reactions to Revenue and Expense Surprises”
Philip G. Berger

The Differential Persistence of Accruals and Cash Flows for Future Operating Income versus Future Profitability
Patricia M. Fairfield, Scott Whisenant, Teri Lombardi Yohn

Discussion of “The Differential Persistence of Accruals and Cash Flows for Future Operating Income versus Future Profitability”
Ilia D. Dichev

Investor Sophistication and the Mispricing of Accruals
Daniel W. Collins, Guojin Gong, Paul Hribar

Discussion of “Investor Sophistication and the Mispricing of Accruals”
Eli Bartov

Performance Evaluation and Corporate Income Taxes in a Sequential Delegation Setting
Tim Baldenius, Amir Ziv

Discussion of “Performance Evaluation and Corporate Income Taxes in a Sequential Delegation Setting”
Madhav V. Rajan

Post-Earnings Announcement Drift and Market Participants’ Information Processing Biases
Lihong Liang

Discussion of “Post-Earnings Announcement Drift and Market Participants’ Information Processing Biases”
Jacob K. Thomas

Why Are Earnings Kinky? An Examination of the Earnings Management Explanation
Patricia M. Dechow, Scott A. Richardson, Irem Tuna

Discussion of “Why are Earnings Kinky? An Examination of the Earnings Management Explanation”
Maureen F. McNichols


Abstracts

 

The Predictive Value of Expenses Excluded from Pro Forma Earnings

Jeffrey T. Doyle

Russell J. Lundholm

Mark T. Soliman

Abstract

We investigate the informational properties of pro forma earnings. This increasingly popular measure of earnings excludes certain expenses that the company deems non-recurring, non-cash, or otherwise unimportant for understanding the future value of the firm. We find, however, that these expenses are far from unimportant. Higher levels of exclusions lead to predictably lower future cash flows. We also find that investors do not fully appreciate the lower cash flow implications at the time of the earnings announcement. A trading strategy based on the excluded expenses yields a large positive abnormal return in the years following the announcement, and persists after controlling for various risk factors and other anomalies.

 

Differential Market Reactions to Revenue and Expense Surprises

Yonca Ertimur

Joshua Livnat

Minna Martikainen

Abstract

This study investigates investors reactions to revenue and expense surprises around preliminary earnings announcements. Results show that investors value more highly a dollar of revenue surprise than a dollar of expense surprise. Results further show that these differential market reactions to revenue and expense surprises vary systematically for growth versus value firms and depend on (a) the proportion of variable to total costs, (b) the relative persistence of sales and expenses, and (c) the proportion of operating to total expenses. Results highlight the importance of interpreting the earnings surprise in the context of its sourcese.g. surprise in revenues or in total expenses.


The Differential Persistence of Accruals and Cash Flows for Future Operating Income versus Future Profitability

Patricia M. Fairfield

Scott Whisenant

Teri Lombardi Yohn

Abstract

Prior research provides evidence that a higher proportion of accrued relative to cash earnings is associated with lower earnings performance in the subsequent fiscal year. The result has been widely interpreted as indicative of higher levels of operating accruals relative to cash flows foreshadowing a subsequent earnings reversal, and thus signaling earnings management. We note, however, that earnings performance in prior studies is typically defined as one-year-ahead operating income divided by one-year-ahead invested capital, or a measure of profitability. We find that accruals are more highly associated than cash flows with invested capital in the denominator of the profitability measure. In contrast, accruals and cash flows have no differential relation to one-year-ahead operating income. The evidence is not consistent with accruals having a reversal effect on earnings. This suggests that the lower persistence of accruals versus cash flows may not be due to earnings management but may rather be due to the effect of growth on future profitability.

 

Investor Sophistication and the Mispricing of Accruals

Daniel W. Collins

Guojin Gong

Paul Hribar

Abstract

This paper examines the role of institutional investors in the pricing of accruals. Using Bushees (1998) classification of institutional investors, we show that firms with a high level of institutional ownership and a minimum threshold level of active institutional traders have stock prices that more accurately reflect the persistence of accruals. This result holds after controlling for differences in the persistence of accruals between firms with high and low institutional ownership, and after controlling for other characteristics that are correlated with institutional ownership and future returns. Additionally, firms with low institutional ownership are smaller, less profitable, and have lower share turnover, suggesting that limits to arbitrage impede institutional investors from exploiting the seemingly large abnormal returns for these firms.

 

Performance Evaluation and Corporate Income Taxes in a Sequential Delegation Setting

Tim Baldenius

Amir Ziv

Abstract

We consider a setting where a firm delegates an investment decision and, subsequently, a sales decision to a privately informed manager. For both decisions corporate income taxes have real effects. We show that compensating the manager based on pre-tax residual income can ensure after-tax NPV-maximization (goal congruence) for each decision problem in isolation. However, this metric fails if both decisions are nontrivial, since it requires asset-specific hurdle rates and hence precludes asset aggregation. After-tax residual income metrics (e.g., EVA) allow the firm to consistently apply its after-tax cost of capital as the hurdle rate to its aggregate asset base. We show that existing tax depreciation schedules may explain why firms in practice use more accelerated depreciation schedules than those suggested by previous studies. Our findings also rationalize the widespread use of dirty surplus accounting for windfall gains and losses for managerial retention purposes.

   

Post-Earnings Announcement Drift and Market Participants Information Processing Biases

Lihong Liang

Abstract

Prior research has been unable to explain the phenomenon known as post-earnings announcement drift, raising questions concerning the semi-strong form efficiency of the market typically assumed in capital market research. This study contributes to our understanding of this anomaly by examining drift in the context of theories that consider investors non-Bayesian behaviors. The empirical evidence reveals that investors overconfidence about their private information and the reliability of the earnings information are two important factors that explain drift. Finally, this study also provides insight into the puzzling relationship between dispersion and drift discussed in prior research.

 

Why Are Earnings Kinky? An Examination of the Earnings Management Explanation

Patricia M. Dechow

Scott A. Richardson

Irem Tuna

Abstract

Prior research has documented a kink in the earnings distribution: too few firms report small losses, too many firms report small profits. We investigate whether boosting of discretionary accruals to report a small profit is a reasonable explanation for this kink. Overall, we are unable to confirm that boosting of discretionary accruals is the key driver of the kink. We caution the use of the ratio of small profit firms to small loss firms as a measure of earnings management. We investigate and discuss a number of alternative explanations for the kink.

 


 


Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 5, Issue 1, 2000



Earnings Preannouncement Strategies
Leonard Soffer, S. Ramu Thiagarajan, and Beverly Walther

Intrafirm Trade, Bargaining Power and Specific Investments
Tim Baldenius

Competitive Effects of Disclosure in a Strategic Entry Model
Yuhchang Hwang and Alison Kirby


Abstracts




Earnings Preannouncement Strategies
Leonard Soffer
S. Ramu Thiagarajan
Beverly Walther

Abstract.  We examine the disclosure strategies managers follow when they "preannounce" quarterly earnings shortly before formal earnings announcements.  We document that managers with bad news release essentially all of their news at the preannouncement date, while managers with good news only release about half of their news.  Controlling for the combined news released at the preannouncement and earnings announcement dates, firms with negative earnings announcement surprises have significantly lower excess returns for the period from just before the preannouncement to just after the earnings announcement.  This finding is consistent with the observed disclosure strategies whereby managers attempt to avoid negative earnings announcement surprises, and suggests that how information is presented can affect the market's reaction to that information.
 

Intrafirm Trade, Bargaining Power and Specific Investments
Tim Baldenius

Abstract. This paper compares the performance of standard-cost versus negotiated transfer pricing under asymmetric information. Negotiated transfer pricing generally achieves higher expected contribution margins, as this method tends to be more efficient in aggregating private information into a single transfer price. While standard-cost transfer pricing generates better incentives for the supplying division to undertake specific investments, the opposite holds for buyer investments, because this method confers more bargaining power to the supplier. If a corporate controller has disaggregated information about divisional costs and revenues, then the firm can improve upon the performance of standard-cost transfer pricing by setting a centralized transfer price equal to expected cost plus a suitably chosen mark-up.
 

Competitive Effects of Disclosure in a Stragetic Entry Model
Yuhchang Hwang
Alison Kirby

Abstract.  We investigate the welfare consequences of incumbent firms' mutual disclosure of cost information when there is a threat of entry from a firm not required to disclose its private cost information.  New effects of disclosure are observed relative to no-entry models, with the result that incumbents' expected output is a decreasing function of the disclosure level.  However, further analysis shows that increased disclosure usually increases incumbent expected profits and decreases expected consumer surplus, despite the additional entry effect of disclosure.  Such analytical derivations provide objective input to the FASB as they attempt to predict the competitive effects of changing mandated disclosure requirements.

 


Review of Accounting Studies
Volume 4, Issues 3 and 4, 1999


Special Conference Issue:  The Impact of Accounting Rules on Valuation and Management Control

Editorial

On Transitory Earnings.
James Ohlson

Discussion:  William Beaver

Evidence on the Usefulness of Capital Expenditures as an Alternative Measure of Depreciation.
Dennis Chambers, Ross Jennings and Robert Thompson

Discussion:  Jeffrey Abarbanell

Accruals, Cash Flow and Equity Values.
Mary Barth, William Beaver, John Hand and Wayne Landsman

Discussion:  Richard Sloan

Asset Valuation and Performance Measurement in a Dynamic Agency Setting.
Sunil Dutta and Stefan Reichelstein

Discussion:  Richard Lambert

Comparing Alternative Hedge Accounting Standards:  Shareholders’ Perspective.
Nahum Melumad, Guy Weyns and Amir Ziv

Discussion:  Chandra Kanodia

The Effects of Taxes, Agency Costs and Information Asymmetry on Earnings Management:  A Comparison of Public and Private Firms.
Anne Beatty and David G. Harris

Discussion:  Douglas Shackelford

Abstracts

ON TRANSITORY EARNINGS

James Ohlson
New York University

 

Abstract:  The paper develops a concept of transitory earnings and contrasts this source of earnings to “core” (or recurring) earnings.  It is shown that any two of the following three attributes of transitory earnings imply the third:  (i)  fore casting irrelevance with respect to next-period aggregate earnings, (ii)  value irrelevance, and (iii)  unpredictability.  The paper makes the case that the current “dirty surplus” items make sense, especially if one expands the valuation perspective to also allow for agency considerations.
 
 

EVIDENCE ON THE USEFULNESS OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURES AS AN ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF DEPRECIATION

Dennis Chambers
University
of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana

Ross Jennings
University
of Texas at Austin

Robert B. Thompson II
Virginia Commonwealth University
 

Abstract:  Investment professionals often suggest that accounting earnings is a more useful indicator of share value if adjusted by substituting current capital expenditures for reported depreciation.  We investigate the usefulness of this alternative depreciation measure by comparing the ability of reported earnings and adjusted earnings to explain the cross-sectional distribution of stock prices for a large sample of manufacturing firms.  We find that adjusted earnings explains a much smaller fraction of the variation in share prices than earnings based on reported depreciation, and provide evidence on the reasons for this difference.
 
 

ACCRUALS, CASH FLOW, AND EQUITY VALUES

Mary E. Barth
William H. Beaver
Graduate School
of Business
Stanford University

John R.M. Hand
Wayne R. Landsman
Kenan-Flagler Business School
University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
 

Abstract:  This paper tests predictions regarding the characteristics of two key components of net income:  Accounting accruals and cash flow from operations.  Our tests use a cross-sectional valuation framework based on Ohlson (1999) and employ Compustat firms with SFAS No. 95 annual data available between 1987-1996.  We report three major findings.  First, when forecasting abnormal earnings is it important to condition on the cash flow and accrual components of earnings.  Second, in explaining equity value, it is also important to condition on these earnings components.  Third, the cash flow and accrual coefficients estimated in the valuation equation are positively correlated with a theoretical coefficient that is a function of the forecasting relevance and predictability of each component.
 
 

ASSET VALUATION AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT IN A DYNAMIC AGENCY SETTING

Sunil Dutta
University
of California, Berkeley

Stefan Reichelstein
University
of California, Berkelely
 

Abstract:  This paper examines the choice of asset valuation rules from a managerial control perspective.  A manager creates value for a firm through his effort choices.  To support its operating activities, the firm also engages in financing activities such as credit sales to its customers.  Since such financing activities merely change the pattern of cash flows across periods, an optimal compensation scheme must shield the manager from the risk associated with the financing activities.  We show that residual income combined with fair value accounting for receivables eliminates this risk and provides an optimal performance measure.  In contrast, compensation schemes based only on realized cash flows can be optimal only under exceptional circumstances.  We also consider a setting in which there is sufficiently disaggregated information about periodic cash flows so as to eliminate not only the risk associated with financing activities but also the risk associated with customer defaults.  The principal then wants to depart from fair value accounting.
 

COMPARING ALTERNATIVE HEDGE ACCOUNTING STANDARDS:  SHAREHOLDERS’ PERSPECTIVE

Nahum Melumad
Columbia University

Guy Weyns
Goldman Sachs, London

Amir Ziv
Columbia University

Abstract:  We study the economic consequences of alternative hedge accounting rules in terms of managerial hedging decisions and wealth effects for shareholders.  The rules we consider include the “fair-value” and “cash-flow” hedge accounting methods prescribed by the recent SFAS No. 133.  We illustrate that the accounting method used influences the manager’s hedge decision.  We show that under no-hedge accounting, the hedge choice is different from the optimal economic hedge the firm would make under symmetric and public information.  However, under a certain definition of fair-value hedge accounting, the hedging decision preserves the optimal economic hedge.  We then demonstrate that long-term and future shareholders prefer a certain definition of fair-value hedge accounting to no-hedge accounting, while short-term shareholders prefer either approach depending on risk preferences and the level of uncertainty.  We speculate about circumstances in which a manager would choose not to adopt fair-value hedge accounting when he has the option not to do so.
 
 

THE EFFECTS OF TAXES, AGENCY COSTS AND INFORMATION ASYMMETRY ON EARNINGS MANAGEMENT:  A COMOPARISON OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FIRMS

Anne Beatty
Penn. State University

David G. Harris
Penn. State University

 

Abstract:  The realization of security gains and losses to manage earnings in publicly-traded bank holding companies has been documented in a large number of studies, but very little is known about why managers engage in this behavior.  Two possible explanations for earnings management put forth by Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) are that managers engage in this behavior either to circumvent accounting-based contracts designed to mitigate agency problems or to reduce information asymmetry.

 We compare public and private banks’ security gain/loss realizations to determine how their earnings management differs.  We find that public banks consistently engage in more earnings management than private banks and that the portion of their current period securities gains and losses realizations attributable to earnings management is more highly associated with next period’s earnings before security gains and losses.  These findings are consistent with earnings management occurring due to greater information asymmetry in public firms, and suggest that earnings management may not necessarily lead to the erosion in the quality of earnings suggested by Levitt (1988).